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We study competitive effects of foreign listings on U.S. stock exchanges over a 50-year period 
and show that U.S. rival firms respond strongly negatively (weakly positively) to foreign listings 
(delistings). The performance decline of U.S. firms is related to the competitive advantages that 
foreign firms receive from their cross-listings, such as stronger financial benefits, higher growth 
prospects, and better visibility, rather than market or industry valuation timing or existing market 
competition. This decline is especially pronounced when cross-listings come from proximate or 
developed markets. Our findings highlight an important role of international markets in 
influencing the performance of U.S. firms. 
 
JEL classifications: D22; F30; G14; G15; G32; M41 








The finance literature has long assessed how financially sound firms use their “long purse” to 
prey on financially vulnerable peers and drive them out of business (see Telser, 1966; Fudenberg 
and Tirole, 1986; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990). Subsequent studies have shown that firms can 
negatively affect their rivals not only by using basic predation strategies, such as lowering the 
prices of their goods, but also through the competitive effects of corporate decisions (e.g., 
Chevalier, 1995; Phillips, 1995; Campello, 2003; Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl, 2010; and others).1 
All these papers examine the within-country competitive impact of corporate decisions. 
In its turn, the international finance literature has extensively examined (i) the impact of a 
foreign firm’s cross-listing on its own valuation and risk characteristics (Foerster and Karolyi, 
1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Lang, Raedy, and Yetman, 2003; Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 
2004, 2009; Hail and Leuz, 2009), (ii) the spillover effects of cross-listing firms on their 
domestic rivals’ stock returns and trading volume (Melvin and Valero-Tonone, 2009; Lee, 2004; 
Zhang, 2009), and (iii) the effect of foreign-listed firms on their domestic market liberalization 
and development (e.g., Bekaert, Harvey, and Lumsdaine, 2002; Errunza, Hogan, and Hung, 
1999; Karolyi, 2004; Sarkissian and Schill, 2004). The general view of all these studies is that 
foreign listing placements in developed markets, especially in the United States, are beneficial to 
firms and their respective home markets based on various performance metrics.2  
The question that the extant literature has not provided a definite answer to yet is whether 
firms cross-listed in a given market, by potentially improving their positions in that market, 
cause any significant cross-country competitive impact on local firms in the host country.3 Thus, 
                                                          
1 Chevalier (1995), Phillips (1995), Kovenock and Phillips (1995, 1997), and Campello (2003, 2006) show that a 
firm’s financing choice influences its conduct in the product market and the conduct of its industry rivals. Liu and 
Parlour (2009), and Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) examine the competitive effects of corporate hedging 
decisions. Fresard (2010) shows that large cash reserves lead to systematic future market share gains at the expense 
of industry rivals. Chen, Ho, and Ik (2006) find that rivals of firms announcing new products experience negative 
wealth effects. Hsu, Reed, and Rocholl (2010) show that firms respond negatively to completed IPOs of their 
competitors and positively to their withdrawal. 
2 Some authors challenge these conclusions, observing that sizable firm-specific gains from foreign listing is a short-
lived phenomenon (see Gozzi, Levine, and Schmukler, 2008; Sarkissian and Schill, 2009, 2016; Siegel, 2004).  
3 Few papers on the spillover effects of cross-listings focus on the stock return impact of their domestic competitors. 
Karolyi (2006) states: “these studies seek to understand the real consequences of cross-listing events … But the 
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we focus on the impact of cross-listings (and delistings) of foreign firms on the stock returns and 
operating performance metrics of competing U.S. firms and the possible mechanisms behind the 
findings.  
We hypothesize that foreign listings may affect their rival firms in the listed market 
through three not mutually exclusive channels: financial, growth, and visibility. The first channel 
(financial) is through increased financial benefits for foreign-listed firms (e.g., easy access to 
credit markets, equity issuance, acquisitions of U.S. firms). Many studies find that the cost of 
capital declines over the short to medium term following a cross-listing in the U.S. market (e.g., 
Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan, 1988; Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Errunza and Miller, 
2000; Hail and Leuz, 2009). Cross-listing also eases foreign firms’ capital constraints by 
facilitating equity offerings in a deep and liquid stock market (see Reese and Weisbach, 2002). 
Indeed, foreign listing has often been recognized as a strategic move for foreign-listed firms to 
pursue a rapid equity-funded expansion in U.S. territory via sales expansion and acquisitions of 
U.S. firms (Tolmunen and Torstila, 2005).4 Therefore, foreign firms can use the lower financing 
cost to pursue an equity-financed expansion in the host market and compete against their U.S. 
rivals, leading to a decline in performance of their U.S. competitors. 
The second channel (growth) is through product market penetration. Foucault and Gehrig 
(2008) and Foucault and Fresard (2012) show that firms cross-listed make better investment 
decisions and achieve higher investment-to-price sensitivity than other firms. Fanto and Kermel 
(1997) show that foreign listings facilitate the foreign firms’ expansion into the U.S. market; e.g., 
foreign firms with access to a deeper financial market can compete against their U.S. rivals by 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
focus is almost always on what happens to the equity trading environment (stock returns, trading volume) for those 
firms, and not on the current and future operating performance of the listing firms and their competitors”. The only 
exception is Bradford, Martin, and Whyte (2002), who analyze the impact of 269 cross-listed firms on their rivals at 
home and abroad using short-term cumulative abnormal returns but find no significant competitive effects (p. 408).   
4 For example, with respect to the 1993 Daimler-Benz cross-listing on the NYSE, it is known that: “Fund raising is 
not the only advantage of listing; there are strategic benefits as well. Banexi’s Dahm stresses that acquisitions are 
facilitated by a listing- perhaps paying for the acquisitions with shares – and there are tax advantages too.” Fisher, 
M. (1993), “Can German firms resist a U.S. listing?” Corporate Finance, Apr. 1993, 101, p. 23. However, the 
proportion of cross-listings with subsequent (within two years) acquisitions of U.S. targets is small. Moreover, 
cross-listed firms are more likely to become acquisition targets themselves (Cosset and Meknassi, 2013). 
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constructing new plants and stores. Pagano, Roell, and Zechner (2002) find that U.S. exchanges 
attract export-oriented European firms that rapidly increase their foreign presence after the 
listing. A vast literature shows that U.S. firms with deep financial pockets can increase their 
market share at the expense of their rivals (e.g., Phillips, 1995; Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996; 
Opler and Titman, 1994; Khanna and Tice, 2000; Fresard, 2010). Therefore, foreign firms that 
expand their sales and investments in the U.S. market following cross-listing exert higher 
competition pressures on their U.S. counterparts, thus, negatively affecting their performance. 
The third channel (visibility) is through increased prominence for foreign firms listed on 
U.S. exchanges due to changes in media attention and investor recognition (Baker, Nofsinger, 
and Weaver, 2002; Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2003; Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock, 2004).5 
Indeed, cross-listing enables a firm to capitalize on its product market reputation by raising 
consumer demand through advertising and improved relations with suppliers and employees. An 
increase in the visibility of foreign cross-listed firms is likely to turn some investor attention 
away from similar U.S. firms and, therefore, negatively affect their performance.  
Our foreign listing sample consists of 1,737 listings from 47 countries and includes all 
listings on regular U.S. exchanges from 1950 to 2011. We measure the impact of foreign listings 
by calculating the relative asset ratio of the total asset value of foreign-listed firms to that of 
U.S. rival firms in each industry-year pair, and we define a ‘foreign listing event’ as an industry-
year in which its relative asset ratio is above 5% (1% or 10%), and that it is not preceded or 
followed by a larger impact of other foreign listings in the surrounding four years. Then we 
select all U.S. competitors in the same four-digit SIC codes with available information within 
four years around the foreign firm listing event year (two years before the event year and two 
after). We obtain 181 foreign listing events in 135 industries that are matched to 1,742 rivals.  
We start by analyzing the valuation impact on U.S. firms from listing and delisting of 
their foreign competitors on U.S. exchanges. We find that U.S. rivals underperform significantly 
                                                          
5 Radebaugh, Gebhardt, and Gray (1995) point out that a non-financial benefit for Daimler-Benz of being listed on 
the NYSE is the publicity: its quotations are published in more than 700 U.S. newspapers. 
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in both the short-run and the long-run. The 60-day underperformance around the listing date is 
negative 2%, while the long-run drop in returns for the 24-month post-event period is about 16%. 
We further show that the listing of a foreign firm in the United States reduces its average U.S. 
counterpart’s EBIT by 12.1% and market share by 0.4%. However, the foreign listing decisions 
are not perfectly random events. To address the concern that our results may be driven by 
changes in the macroeconomic environment or industry trends, we adopt a matching difference-
in-difference (DID) approach. We create a matched sample of U.S. firms in industries that do not 
experience any listing events. To ensure comparability, we match firms that operate in industries 
affected by foreign listing events (treated firms) with otherwise similar firms in industries that do 
not experience any listing events (matched firms). This allows us to compare two similar sets of 
U.S. firms, with the only difference between them being their exposure (or the absence of it) to 
foreign listings. Using the DID approach and with firm fixed effects, we show that the listing of 
a foreign firm in the U.S. market reduces its U.S. rival’s EBIT and market share by 12.5% and 
0.5% respectively, relative to comparable firms that do not experience any listing events.  
Then, we analyze how performance declines of U.S. rivals are related to market, industry, 
and U.S. firm characteristics. There are several market-level attributes related to capital gains 
from cross-listing: investor familiarity, financial market development, investor protection rules, 
disclosure standards, and market liquidity. Familiarity between two countries plays an important 
role in cross-listing decisions and cross-listed firms with higher economic and industry proximity 
are more likely to be listed and achieve some valuation premium (Sarkissian and Schill, 2004, 
2009). Also, as argued in Stulz (1999) and Doidge et al. (2004, 2009), U.S. foreign listing 
premiums can be explained by improvements in investor protection and information 
dissemination by bonding to a financially better developed host market with more stringent legal 
and disclosure standards. In addition, studies find that foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges 
achieve significant liquidity improvements post-listing (Werner and Kleidon, 1996; Domowitz, 
Glen, and Madhavan, 1998; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998). Since foreign-listed firms gain more if 
the U.S. market capitalization to GDP ratio, and disclosure standards are higher than the same 
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measures in the home markets of foreign firms, or when they come from familiar countries, U.S. 
rivals are expected to suffer more competition pressures under these very conditions. We find 
consistent support for our conjecture. 
We show that U.S. firms in competitive industries are less immune to rivalry from their 
cross-listed peers (Hoberg and Phillips, 2010). In line with the findings that foreign listing 
decisions are related to their export routes and product market trades (Saudagaran, 1988; Mittoo, 
1992; Pagano et al., 2002), we see particularly detrimental effects on U.S. rivals in industries 
with high proportions of foreign sales. Likewise, cross-listed foreign firms have a higher cost of 
capital gains in industries with stronger reliance on external finance to realize growth: U.S. rivals 
in such industries exhibit larger performance losses. Moreover, the underperformance of U.S. 
rivals is more evident among smaller and younger firms, and firms with lower market shares that 
are less immune to competition and more prone to financial distress (Buzzell, Gale, and Sultan, 
1975; Smallwood and Conlick, 1979; Ortiz-Molina and Phillips, 2014). Finally, consistent with 
the notion that purely domestic and single-segment firms are more risky and are restricted in 
resource allocation (Michel and Shaked, 1986; Stein, 1997; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; 
Schoar, 2002), we observe that U.S. rivals with these characteristics experience similar 
performance loses. Our results also hold for U.S. firms with and without IPO issuance.  
We explain the performance decline of U.S. rivals after listings of foreign firms by their 
post-listing competitive advantages, namely, financial, growth, and visibility gains. First, U.S. 
rivals experience more significant performance losses if a foreign listed firm adopts an equity-
financed expansion strategy through issuing equity on U.S. exchanges or acquiring U.S. targets. 
The U.S. rivals’ underperformance is more severe when a foreign competitor has a higher market 
valuation after listings. This evidence is consistent with our conjecture that U.S. rival firms 
experience more operating performance decline if foreign firms gain more financial benefits 
through listing on U.S. exchanges. Second, foreign-listed firms experiencing higher growth in 
assets, sales, and capital investments, exert more pressure on the performance of U.S. 
incumbents. This is consistent with our argument that foreign listing facilitates the product 
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market penetration of foreign firms in the host market, especially for firms with higher growth 
potential, leading to the subsequent decline in performance of their U.S. rivals. Finally, we proxy 
the visibility of foreign-listed firms by institutional holdings, analyst following, and trading 
volume, and show that U.S. incumbents experience worse performance if their foreign 
competitors enjoy higher visibility after listing on U.S. exchanges. This is consistent with a 
conjecture that foreign firms listed in the United States drive away the attention of investors from 
their U.S. rivals and negatively affect their rivals’ operating performance.  
We perform several tests to exclude alternative explanations for our results. We exclude 
the market timing explanation by showing that the market reaction of U.S. incumbent firms to 
foreign listings is not driven by foreign listings occurring in the high U.S. market or industry 
valuation periods. We also exclude existing product market competition explanation, as we find 
that the competitive impact of foreign-listed firms on U.S. rivals is unique in a timeline with no 
similar underperformance prior to the listing events. In addition, our results are not driven by the 
market entry of U.S.-listed foreign firms, but, rather, their existing U.S. business presence only 
reinforces the negative competitive effect on U.S. rivals after cross- listings. 
Our paper provides novel evidence of cross-country rivalry by establishing the link 
between cross-listing and product market competition studies, adding to the empirical literature 
on the competitive effects of corporate decisions (Chevalier, 1995; Phillips, 1995; Kovenock and 
Phillips, 1995, 1997; Campello, 2003, 2006; Liu and Parlour, 2009; Campello et al., 2011; Chen 
et al., 2006). Our study differs from those papers in several important respects. First, we show 
that corporate decisions of not only domestic firms but also foreign companies have direct 
competitive effects on local rivals.6 Second, cross-listings, unlike IPOs or SEOs, come with or 
without equity issuance.7 This allows the investigation of multidimensional competitive effects 
besides those that arise from the loosening of financial constraints due to equity issuance. Third, 
a multi-country setting allows us to look at host–home market determinants of the strength of 
                                                          
6 The United States has attracted about 40% of all cross-listings between the 1950s and 2000s (Sarkissian and Schill, 
2016). Thus, it must have encountered the highest competition among all other countries with foreign listings. 
7 The proportion of foreign listings with equity offerings was 14–47% in 1980–1998 (Sarkissian and Schill, 2009). 
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competitive effects of corporate decisions and uncover new cross-market linkage mechanisms. In 
particular, we identify three channels (financial, growth, and visibility), through which foreign 
cross-listed firms impact their U.S. rivals and determine what country-level characteristics matter 
most for the observed competitive effects. Finally, we are able to refute market timing and 
industry valuation timing explanations for our findings, because, our documented effect is the 
strongest during low market and industry valuations times. Overall, the competitive effects that 
we observe, while largely negative for U.S. rivals’ performance in the two years following the 
listings, benefit the U.S. economy as a whole in the long term.8 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the stock return 
performance of U.S. rival firms. Section 3 presents the tests on the long-run financial 
performance of U.S. rival firms. Section 4 examines the influence of market, industry, and firm 
attributes on our findings. Section 5 analyzes three impact channels. Section 6 discusses 
alternative explanations for our results. Section 7 concludes. An Internet Appendix provides 
several robustness tests. 
 
2. Stock Market Performance of U.S. Incumbent Firms 
2.1. Foreign Listing Data Sample 
Our study period is from 1950 to 2011. We construct our foreign listing sample from several 
sources and restrict it to placements on regular U.S. exchanges (AMEX, NYSE, and NASDAQ) 
and to countries not classified as tax havens. We collect ADR data using the Citigroup ADR 
database and screen U.S. exchanges for direct foreign listings (e.g., from Canada, Israel). Finally, 
we cross-check the data with foreign listing codes from CRSP and leave only those foreign firms 
that have identifiable SIC codes. We also restrict our sample to first-time foreign listings in the 
United States, and we do not require that the first foreign listing is preceded by a domestic 
listing. This selection procedure leaves us with a final sample of 1,737 foreign listings (direct or 
                                                          
8 See Bils and Klenow (2004), Irvine and Pontiff (2009), and London (2004). For example, Bloom and Van Reenen 
(2007) show that U.S. firms benefit from competition through improved management practices. 
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Level II or III ADRs) from 47 countries. In addition, following Chaplinsky and Ramchand 
(2008), we obtain a sample of foreign firms that delisted from U.S. exchanges using CRSP data. 
CRSP provides information on the delisting codes and dates of both U.S. and foreign firms. We 
restrict our foreign delisting sample to CRSP delisting codes 400–499, 535–591, and 600–610, 
but exclude delistings due to exchange change or mergers and acquisitions. This results in 526 
delisting securities of non-U.S. firms in our sample period. 
Table 1 shows the frequency distribution of foreign listings on U.S. exchanges across 
countries, time, and industries. Panel A gives the distribution of foreign listings across countries 
and calendar periods. The largest number of foreign listings in the United States comes from 
Canada (40% of the sample). The United Kingdom and Israel rank as the second and third largest 
suppliers of listings to U.S. exchanges, respectively. Across calendar periods, the United States 
attracted the largest volume of foreign listings (885) during the 1990s. In contrast, there were 
only five listings in the 1950s. Panel B shows the distribution of foreign delistings across 
countries and calendar periods. Most of these events are concentrated in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Canada has the largest number of delisted firms, the majority of which occurred in the 1990s, 
and is the only country with recorded delistings from U.S. exchanges in the pre-1980 period. 
 
2.2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns of U.S. Firms 
We start our analysis of the impact of foreign listing and delisting on U.S. rival firms by 
examining cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the dates of all foreign firms in our 
sample listed in and delisted from the United States, respectively. We define industry using four-
digit SIC codes and the rival firms are defined as the U.S. firms with the same four-digit SIC 
code as the foreign listing firm. We restrict our definition of industry competitors to the four-
digit SIC codes because firms at a less disaggregated level are more likely to include suppliers or 
clients rather than direct competitors of foreign companies. The cumulative abnormal returns are 
calculated based on the three-factor Fama–French model (Fama and French, 1993).9  
                                                          
9 The Internet Appendix shows that our results are similar for CARs based on the CAPM or Carhart (1997) model. 
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Since we have a different number of U.S. competitors matched with each listing 
depending on the industry, to avoid biasing the weight of abnormal returns towards industries 
with larger number of firms, we construct a portfolio of competitors for each listing. Specifically, 
we define the portfolio k return at time t, , as the equally-weighted average of stock returns at 
time t, Ri,t, across all matched U.S. industry competitors, namely:
10 
,                 (1) 
where Nk is the number of matched U.S. competitors in the same industry for a given listing k. 
Then we calculate daily CARs as the sum of the residuals from the Fama–French model as: 
,           (2) 
where Rf,t is the daily return on the three-month Treasury bill, Rm,t 
is the daily return on the 
CRSP value-weighted market index, and SMBt and HMLt are the Fama–French size and book-to-
market factors for day t, respectively. The coefficients , , , and  are the OLS 
estimated three-factor model coefficients from the estimation period, which runs between day –
255 and day –30 prior to the foreign listing date. T is the duration of the event window. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the CARs of U.S. incumbents over various short-run windows 
around the foreign listing and delisting events. This table also shows the number of portfolios 
and the p-value of average CARs. We use four event windows: (–5; +5), (–10; +10), (–20; +20), 
and (–30; +30) days. We observe that CARs from foreign listing events across all four windows 
are negative and significant at the 1% level. Moreover, they generally increase in magnitude with 
window horizon from –0.8% for the ten-day window, to –2.2% for the 40-day window, and –
1.7% for the 60-day window. In contrast, CARs from foreign delisting events are positive and 
significant for all event windows at least at the 10% level, except for the 10-day window. The 
CARs from delisting are markedly smaller than those from listings in any given window.  
                                                          
10 Our results remain intact if we switch to a value-weighted portfolio of rival firms using market capitalization as 























k̂ k̂ kŝ kĥ
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To deepen our understanding of the dynamics of CARs of U.S. incumbent firms around 
the listing and delisting dates of foreign firms, in Figure 1, Plot A we show these series over the 
entire 60-day window around the respective events. We can see that the decrease (increase) in 
CARs from foreign firm listings (delistings) starts before the event, although the largest changes 
in returns occur after the event dates in both cases. The pre-listing and pre-delisting run-ups may 
be attributed to the announcement effect. Foerster and Karolyi (1999) report that the median 
difference between the announcement and listing dates of foreign firms listed in the U.S. is 44 
days.11 Thus, Table 2A and Figure 1A indicate that such corporate events of non-U.S. firms as 
listing on or delisting from a U.S. exchange have profound short-term performance implications 
for competing U.S. firms in the same industries. 
The next question is to determine whether the observed patterns of U.S. firm returns 
around listing and delisting dates of foreign firms is a short-lived phenomenon or whether they 
continue in the long-run too. For this task, we calculate long-run CARs for each listing and 
delisting event following our approach for short-run CARs. Specifically, we apply the Fama–
French model by regressing the pre-event monthly excess returns of portfolio k on the market, 
size, and book-to-market portfolios. We restrict our sample portfolios to at least 15 months of 
pre-listing data for estimation. Then, we cumulate the estimated residuals for each event window. 
Table 2, Panel B shows the test results. We report CARs over four long-run windows 
spanning 6, 12, 18, and 24 months after both the listing and delisting events.12 We observe that 
the long-run performance of U.S. rival firms follows the short-run downward trend. While their 
average CARs one year after the foreign listing event is almost –8%, by the end of the second 
year the underperformance approaches –16%. The CARs of any event window are always 
statistically significant. On the delisting side, the reaction of U.S. incumbent firms is almost nil. 
There is no evidence of statistical significance in CARs for any of the four event windows. To 
                                                          
11 We focus on the listing dates instead of announcement dates since many announcement dates are unavailable. 
12 We consider a two-year maximum long-run window for listing events. This is supported by a series of long-run 
studies, all of which report that the largest impact of various corporate events usually lasts the first two years after 
the event (see, e.g., Loughran and Ritter, 1995, 1997, for IPOs and SEOs, respectively; Dharan and Ikenberry, 1995, 
for new exchange listings; and Sarkissian and Schill, 2009, for cross-listings). 
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visualize the long-term patterns in the performance of U.S. incumbent firms around the listing 
and delisting dates of foreign firms, in Figure 1, Plot B we show these series over the entire 24-
month window after the respective events. The observed patterns fully reflect the corresponding 
results over various window estimations from Table 2B.  
Thus, consistent with short-run results in Table 2A and Figure 1A, Table 2B and Figure 
1B again highlight a more profound and long-lasting impact of foreign listings, rather than 
delistings, on the stock market performance of U.S. incumbent firms. The asymmetry in the 
duration of the impact of listing and delisting events is not surprising, since a cross-listed firm 
may influence U.S. firms during the whole cross-listing period, while a delisted firm’s influence 
cannot be prolonged much after its withdrawal from a U.S. exchange. Due to these observations, 
our subsequent analysis only focuses on the effects of foreign listing events on U.S. firms. 
 
3. Financial Performance of U.S. Incumbent Firms 
In the previous section, we showed the drastic impact that foreign firm listings have on the stock 
market performance of their competing U.S. firms. In this section, we further examine the long-
run financial performance of U.S. incumbents. Note that the evaluation of long-run financial 
performance of U.S. rivals is based on annual data, and it requires a clean pre- and post-event 
window. This requirement precludes the possibility of using our full sample of 1,737 foreign 
listings. Rather, we must identify the main listing events affecting a given U.S. industry in a 
given year.  
 
3.1. Foreign Listing Events 
To assess the impact of a foreign listing on its U.S. industry competitors, we use our industry 
definition based on the four-digit SIC codes and construct our listing events as follows. Since 
foreign listings are not isolated in times, often we have multiple listings in an industry in any 
given year, or we have consecutive listings within several years. For example, there were 20 
foreign listings in the Gold and Silver Ores industry (SIC=1040) in 1982, followed by another 12 
12 
 
foreign listings in the same industry in 1983. The challenge in this situation is to focus on only 
those foreign listings the impact of which on U.S. competitors is likely to be the most important 
and not contaminated by the effect of preceding or subsequent foreign listing events. To isolate 
the foreign listing event with the largest impact, we measure the importance of foreign listings by 
the relative ratio of the total assets of foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges to that of U.S. rivals 
and select those industry-years in which such ratio exceeds 5% (or 1% or 10% as alternatives). 
This procedure allows us to avoid accounting for listing events associated with small foreign 
firms. Then, we select only those industry-years that are not preceded or followed by a larger 
foreign listing within four years surrounding the listing year. 
The above selection procedure results in 181 ‘foreign listing events’ across 135 
industries. It has at least two benefits. First, we are able to produce a relatively clean pre- and 
post-event period to conduct the performance comparison of competing U.S. firms around 
foreign listing events. Second, the selected events spread evenly across time and are not subject 
to composition bias. Note that the relative surges and contractions in the foreign listing activity 
documented by Sarkissian and Schill (2016) in the U.S. and other countries are observed in our 
sample as well. For example, as we pointed out earlier, in the 1990s, the U.S. attracted the largest 
share of foreign listings in its history (more than 50% of the sample). If we use the full sample of 
foreign listings, the unbalanced weights towards the surge in U.S. listings in the 1990s may bias 
our results. 13  We then select all U.S. industry competitors who are listed on regular U.S. 
exchanges in the same industry-year. We restrict our sample selection of U.S. rivals to firms in 
the CRSP/Compustat merged database with stock returns, financial performance measurements 
and control variables available around foreign listing events. We have 1,742 incumbent industry 
                                                          
13 In addition, Sarkissian and Schill (2009, 2016) find that foreign listing activity in any given market coincides with 
high valuations of that market. Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) show that other corporate events in the United States, 
such as issuances of IPOs and SEOs, also occur in waves and are correlated with strong U.S. economic and financial 
performance. Therefore, without our foreign listing selection scheme, the average performance of U.S. rival firms is 
more likely to be driven by hot market conditions during which most domestic equity issuance and foreign listing 
placements occur, rather than cross-listing events themselves. Since our selection of events is evenly distributed 
across the sample period, our analysis is not biased towards those hot market valuation and equity issuance periods.  
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competitors matching our 181 foreign listing events, representing 270 foreign listing placements. 
In other words, on average, there are 10 U.S. competitors per foreign listing event.  
 
3.2. Three Mechanism Measures 
To investigate the relationship between the long-run operating performance of U.S. rival firms 
and foreign firms’ competitive advantages from listings on U.S. exchanges, we construct a 
variety of financial, growth, and visibility measures for foreign firms. Stock market information 
is from CRSP and accounting information is from Compustat. The information on foreign sales 
and assets are from Worldscope. Information on analyst following is from I/B/E/S.14 
To capture possible financial advantages that foreign firms may gain after cross-listing on 
U.S. exchanges, similar to other studies (e.g., Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz, 2004), we consider a 
foreign firm Tobin’s Q. A higher Tobin’s Q indicates higher expected financial gains from this 
listing. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the total asset and market values of the firm less its book value 
over the total asset value in the year of listing. We also construct two dummy variables that can 
capture an equity-financed expansion strategy of foreign firms after listing on U.S. exchanges: 
one indicates whether this listing is accompanied by an equity issuance in the United States, 
while the other one indicates whether a foreign firm acquires a U.S. target within two years after 
the listing. These two variables directly specify whether a foreign firm takes advantage of the 
lower cost of financing and expands its business in the United States by acquiring U.S.-
domiciled target firms. 
To measure the product market penetration of foreign firms into the U.S. market, we 
compute the foreign firms’ total asset growth, total sales growth, and capital expenditure 
following the year of listing. A foreign firm with higher asset (sales) growth and more capital 
investments is more likely to exert pressure on its U.S. peer firms. Asset Growth (Sales Growth) 
is computed as the log change in total assets (sales). Capital Expenditure is the ratio of capital 
expenditures over the lagged total assets. 
                                                          
14 I/B/E/S gives analyst coverage information from 1975, so our sample of rival firms reduces in the test of visibility.  
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To measure the increased prominence of foreign firms after cross-listing, we compute the 
foreign firms’ institutional holdings, analyst coverage, and trading volume following the year of 
listing. Institutional holdings is a dummy that is equal to one if a foreign listed firm is held by at 
least one institutional block holder, and is zero otherwise. Analyst coverage is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if a foreign listed firm is followed by an analyst, and zero otherwise. Trading 
volume is the total shares traded in the year of listing scaled by the total shares outstanding.  
 
3.3. Main Variable Construction 
To examine the impact of foreign listings on U.S. rival firms’ business performance, we use the 
EBIT and market share (MkShr) of U.S. firms. EBIT is the earnings before interest and taxes 
normalized by firm sales. MkShr is the U.S. firm sales divided by the total industry sales, 
including the sales of foreign-listed firms. 
Our set of control variables includes five U.S. firm characteristics. The first variable is 
size, which is related to product efficiency (e.g., economies of scale) and market power, and is 
measured by the log of a firm’s total assets. Spence (1977) shows that a firm’s operating 
performance changes over time, increasing briefly earlier in its life span, then increasing less or 
even decreasing at later stages. To address the concern that the incumbent firms’ performance 
may be varying across their life-cycle, our second variable is firm age. This is defined as the 
number of years since the firm’s first trading date on a U.S. stock exchange. The third variable is 
firm leverage. Financial distress negatively impacts firm performance (Opler and Titman, 1993). 
Debt may also influence strategic interaction among competitors, customers and/or suppliers. 
Brander and Lewis (1986) argue that firms exhibit more aggressive product market strategies by 
choosing positive debt levels. Chevalier (1995) finds that firms undertaking leveraged buyouts 
with a substantial increase of their leverage face more intense competitive pressure from rival 
firms.15 Therefore, we expect that more leveraged U.S. firms will see larger losses from listings 
                                                          
15 In addition, Phillips (1995) finds that firms which increase their debt either lose market share or fail to gain it 
when smaller rivals exit the industry. Campello (2003), consistent with the model of Chevalier and Scharfstein 
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of competing foreign firms on U.S. exchanges. We define leverage as the long-term debt divided 
by the sum of long-term debt and market value of equity one year before the foreign listing year. 
To control for the firm’s valuation level, our fourth variable is its market-to-book ratio calculated 
as the total market capitalization divided by the book value of equity. Finally, Blanchard, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1994) and Harford (1999) find that large cash holdings often lead to 
firm inefficiencies. Our fifth variable is therefore the firm’s cash holdings defined as the dollar 
amount of cash and short-term investments divided by the total assets. 
 
3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of foreign listed and incumbent U.S. firms. Panel A reports 
the distribution of cross-listing events over industries and calendar decades. Industry 
abbreviations are as in Table 1. Note that most of the cross-listing events occur in the 1990s, in 
contrast to Table 1, where most of cross-listings in our sample occur in the 2000s. Cross-listings 
of manufacturing firms constitute 57% of the events sample, compared to only 35% in the 
overall sample of foreign listed firms.  
Panel B of Table 3 shows the summary statistics of foreign firm characteristics in the 
sample of 270 foreign firms in 181 listing events. They are divided into three categories that 
proxy for different competitive advantages gained by foreign firms through cross-listing, namely 
financial gains, product market penetration, and increased visibility. This panel shows that the 
average Tobin’s Q of foreign-listed firms is around 2.8, which are consistent with the prior 
findings on the valuation of foreign listings (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Miller, 1999; Sarkissian 
and Schill, 2009). In our sample of 270 foreign listed firms, there are 22% and 19% of listing 
firms are accompanied either by an equity issuance in U.S. exchanges within one year after 
listing or by a U.S. target takeover within two years after the listing. Furthermore, foreign-listed 
firms experience rapid growth in assets and sales, which is consistent with prior findings that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(1996), finds that leverage has a negative impact on sales growth among firms in industries where rival firms are on 
average less levered, especially during recessions. 
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export-oriented foreign firms expand their business in the United States (Pagano et al., 2002). 
Moving to the visibility measures, on average about 14% of foreign firms are held by at least one 
institutional block holder and about 25% of foreign firms are followed by at least one financial 
analyst in the year of listing. The average trading volume of a listed foreign firm is 
approximately 17%. 
Panel C of Table 3 compares the main performance measures and other characteristics of 
U.S. rival firms to those of foreign firms. The last two columns report the difference in the means 
for each characteristic between foreign and U.S. firms, Diff (F-US), and the corresponding 
absolute t-statistic. We observe that foreign firms, in comparison to U.S. industry competitors, 
are much larger and have a much higher market share. The average total assets and market shares 
are 16bln (3bln) and 12.3% (5.6%), respectively, for foreign (competing U.S.) firms. In contrast, 
U.S. firms have a significantly higher market-to-book ratio. EBIT is statistically 
indistinguishable between foreign and U.S. firms. Foreign and U.S. firms are in general 
comparable in terms of leverage and cash holdings. 
 
3.5. Aggregate Performance Tests  
We now proceed to examine the potential changes in U.S. firms’ overall performance around the 
placement of shares on U.S. exchanges by foreign firms. We start by conducting a multivariate 
test of U.S. industry competitors around listing events using the following model: 
, , , , ,                   (3) 
where Perfi,t is one of the corresponding performance metrics of firm i in years t, i.e., its EBIT or 
market share. EBIT is U.S. rival’s earnings before interest and taxes normalized by its sales. 
Market share is the ratio of U.S. rival’s sales over the total industry sales, including the sales of 
cross-listed firms. PLi,t is a post-listing dummy variable which is equal to one for each of the two 
years after the foreign listing event year and zero for each of the two years before the listing 
event year. Vector Xi,t 
consists of independent variables, including our five firm-level controls. 
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We also account for industry fixed effects, Industryi, to control for time-invariant differences 
across industries, and year fixed effects, Yeart, to control for aggregate macroeconomic shocks.  
 Table 4 shows the impact of foreign listings in the United States for two aggregate 
business performance metrics of U.S. firms. It also reports the number of observations and the 
adjusted R-squared for each regression. Baker and Wurgler (2002) and Schill (1999) find that 
managers are more likely to issue new equity when industries have high valuations. Sarkissian 
and Schill (2012, 2016) observe market and industry waves in foreign listings, and that firms are 
usually placed overseas when they are highly valued. Therefore, it is important to impose robust-
cluster standard errors at the industry-year level to account for error correlations across different 
industries and time periods. The first two columns report the estimates of PL for our foreign 
listing events defined based on the 5% relative ratio of foreign firm assets to those of competing 
U.S. firms; columns (3–4) do so for the alternative 1% ratio; and finally columns (5–6) for the 
second alternative 10% ratio. We have 251 (140) foreign listing events (industry-years) using 1% 
(10%) relative asset ratio, which are matched with 371 (211) foreign-listed firms and 2,561 
(1,309) corresponding U.S. incumbent firms. Irrespective of the different cutoffs of the relative 
asset ratio, the coefficient on PL is negative and significant in all regressions. This indicates that 
the overall financial performance of U.S. rival firms deteriorates after the listing of their foreign 
rivals on U.S. exchanges, which is consistent with findings on long-term stock market 
performance in Section 2. In economic terms, for example, for our main specification based on 
the 5% ratio, the listing of a foreign firm in the U.S. reduces its average U.S. counterpart’s EBIT 
by around 12% and market share by 0.4%.  
The reported coefficients on control variables are generally intuitive. Firms with larger 
total assets exhibit consistently higher EBIT and market share. A similarly positive, yet 
economically and statistically weaker, relationship exists between older firms and some 
performance metrics. Furthermore, the performance of a more leveraged firm is inferior to that of 
a less leveraged firm. Finally, U.S. firms with higher market-to-book ratios and those with larger 
cash reserves perform worse than firms with lower valuation ratios and less cash holdings. 
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 The main concern with the Table 4 results is that the observed pattern in the performance 
of U.S. rivals may not be confined to firms that operate in industries that face pressure from 
foreign listed firms. Rather, it simply reflects a market-wide trend in our data sample. To exclude 
this possibility, in the following tests, we use a difference-in-difference (DID) approach. 
Specifically, we construct a matched sample of firms that do not belong to industries 
experiencing foreign listing events and compare their performance with our existing sample of 
(“treated”) firms, which are influenced by such events. We select a “matched” firm for each of 
the 1,742 U.S. rivals from “non-treated” firms based on their key characteristics one year before 
the event. Following Almeida et al. (2012), we match firms on the basis of their size (logarithm 
of total assets), growth opportunities (market-to-book ratio), firm leverage, cash holdings, and 
ROA in the one year preceding the event. We use a matching algorithm that minimizes the 
Mahalanobis distance across all these matching characteristics and select its closest neighbor as a 
match. That is, for each treated firm i, we find a matched firm j with the lowest Mahalanobis 
distance value.16 Following this procedure, we have 1,742 matched firms. 
 Table 5 shows the comparison of matching firm characteristics between rival and 
matched U.S. firms. It reports the means, medians, and the 25th and 75th percentiles of the 
distribution for each variable, as well as the difference test with the corresponding p-value 
between average estimates in the matched and treated samples (last column). Panel A presents 
the univariate comparison between the two samples of firms for the five matching variables. As 
we can see, the matched firms are fairly close to the treated firms across all five firm 
characteristics: the difference test is insignificant in all instances. In other words, the matching 
process removes any meaningful differences between the two groups along the matching firm 
characteristics.  
Another concern is that the timing of a foreign firm’s entry into U.S. exchanges is based 
on a deliberate choice by the firm and is thus endogenous. Foreign firms may list in the United 
                                                          
16 Mahalanobis distance is measured as ∥ ∥ ′ / , where X is a k-dimensional 
vector of covariates and  is the inverse of the covariance matrix of the covariates. 
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States when they experience high growth opportunities, whereas their U.S. competitors may have 
(or be expected to have) difficulties in sustaining growth. Hence, it is important to select 
matching firms with similar growth prospects as those firms affected by foreign listing events. In 
Panel B of Table 5 we show the univariate comparison of growth opportunities between treated 
and matched firms one year before the listing. We use six different proxies for firms’ growth 
opportunities: (i) Earnings Estimates, which is the average earnings per share (EPS) estimate 
from I/B/E/S for the next fiscal year; (ii) LT EPS Growth from I/B/E/S, which is the average 
long-term earnings growth rate for the next five years; (iii) Analyst Recommendations, which is 
the average recommendation from I/B/E/S measured on a five-point scale; (iv) Sales Growth; 
and (v) Total Asset Growth. Note that the number of observations for Earnings Estimates, LT 
EPS Growth, and Analyst Recommendation are much lower than for other firm characteristics 
because of data availability. We observe that one year before the listing event, treated firms and 
matching firms show similar sales growth and total asset growth. In addition, financial analysts’ 
expectations of the future growth of earnings and investment recommendations are also similar 
for both samples of firms. The difference test in the last column of the panel shows no statistical 
discrepancy in the average estimates of any proxy for firm growth opportunities between the 
matched and treated samples. This indicates that prior to the listing events financial analysts 
view the growth prospects and thus future performance of treated and matching firms to be 
similar. 
Thus, we can conclude that we are able to identify two samples among publicly traded 
U.S. firms that are statistically identical to each other across a variety of firm-specific 
characteristics, including several variables that reflect future growth opportunities and 
performance. The only substantive difference between the two samples is whether the U.S. firms 
experience a foreign listing event in their respective industry. This result allows us to implement 
the DID method and examine whether the aggregate underperformance of U.S. rivals from 
listing of foreign firms on U.S. exchanges shown in Table 4 is unique to this sample of U.S. 
firms. Furthermore, to properly identify a change in the exposure of U.S. firms to their foreign 
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rivals from the time period before foreign listing to that after, we use firm fixed effects. This 
approach converts model (3) into the following specification: 
, , , , , , ,        (4) 
where Treated is the treated sample dummy, which is equal to one for U.S. incumbent firms in 
industries experiencing foreign listing events and is zero otherwise; the firm fixed effects, Firmi, 
control time-invariant differences across firms. Note that we still run several tests of model (4) 
with industry fixed effects. All other control variables are the same as in model (3). The main 
coefficient of interest is , which measures the changes in performance metrics surrounding a 
listing event for treated U.S. incumbent firms relative to their corresponding matching firms. 
Table 6 shows the DID regressions results of model (4). Panel A reports test results using 
industry and year fixed effects. Panel B reports test results with firm and year fixed effects. For 
the sake of brevity, in this table and thereafter we omit reporting the estimates of the control 
variables. Similar to Table 4, the first two columns of each panel report the DID estimates based 
on the 5% relative ratio of foreign firm assets to those of competing U.S. firms; columns (3–4) 
do so for the alternative 1% ratio; and finally columns (5–6) for the second alternative 10% ratio. 
In Panel A, we control for industry and year fixed effects. We see a consistent picture across all 
six columns of the panel. The interaction term is negative and significant at the 1% level in all 
estimations. In columns (1–2), we see that the EBIT and market share of U.S. incumbent firms in 
affected industries decline by 17.6% and 0.8% respectively from the pre-event levels relative to 
their matching firms. In Panel B, we control for firm and year fixed effects. The test results are 
similar to those in Panel A: the interaction term is again negative and significant in all 
estimations, although mainly at the 5% level. Furthermore, since we select our events based on 
various relative asset ratios (which measure the impact of foreign-listed firms on their U.S. 
rivals), we can determine whether this selection criterion affects our results.  In columns (3–4) of 
both panels with a lower asset ratio of 1%, we observe marginally weaker estimates of declines 
in the performance of U.S. rival firms. In contrast, in columns (5–6) of both panels with a higher 
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asset ratio (10%), we observe even a stronger impact on the performance of U.S. incumbents. 
Thus, the larger the asset ratio cutoff level, the more U.S. rival firms suffer from their foreign 
competitors. Such a consistent result across various model specifications provides substantive 
evidence that foreign listings indeed significantly and negatively affect U.S. firms in the 
industries in which these listings take place.17 
 
4. Cross-Sectional Differences in U.S. rival firm underperformance 
The previous section has established a significant relation between the placement of foreign 
listings on U.S. exchanges and the subsequent underperformance of U.S. rivals at the aggregate 
level. In this section, we examine how U.S. rival firm underperformance varies across cross-
country host–home market, industry, and rival firm characteristics.  
 
4.1. Market Characteristics 
First, we examine the relationship between cross-sectional differences in the underperformance 
of U.S. rival firms and country-level characteristics of their foreign listed competitors. We 
identify several cross-market attributes that have been shown previously to be related to capital 
market gains from foreign listing: investor familiarity (or proximity) – namely, geographic, 
economic, industrial, and cultural proximity – as well as relative market size, investor protection 
rules, financial disclosure standards, and market liquidity.  
As shown in Sarkissian and Schill (2004), the geographic, economic, cultural, and 
industrial proximity of a foreign country plays a dominant role in the cross-listing decisions.18 
Also, Sarkissian and Schill (2009) find that foreign-listed firms with higher industrial proximity 
achieve a higher return premium within five years after the listing. Hence, we hypothesize that 
                                                          
17  In the Internet Appendix we conduct tests similar to those in Table 6, Panel A, but with two alternative 
performance metrics, the return on equity, ROE, and the return on assets, ROA. Our findings are consistent with 
those of our two main performance measures in Table 6. 
18 As argued in Sarkissian and Schill (2004), geographic, economic, industrial, and cultural proximities may be 




U.S. rivals experience greater competition pressures if foreign-listed firms come from markets 
with higher geographic, economic, industrial, and cultural proximity to the U.S. market.  
Table 7 reports the results from the subsample splits of the DID regression in column (1) 
of Table 6, Panel B using the above-mentioned market characteristics. Panel A shows the 
estimates based on four proximity characteristics of domestic markets of foreign-listed firms to 
the United States, namely geographic, economic, industrial, and cultural. Geographic Proximity 
is the inverse of the great circle distance between Washington D.C. and the capital cities of 
markets of cross-listed firms. Economic Proximity is the proportion of exports from a foreign 
country into the United States. Industrial Proximity is the correlation in the ranked industry 
distribution of firms listed abroad between foreign country and the United States. Cultural 
Proximity is a dummy equal to one if a foreign country shares the same language or colonial ties 
with the United States. All four variables are from Sarkissian and Schill (2004, 2016). The 
sample splits using the first three proximity measures are made at the median. We observe 
drastic differences in rival U.S. firm performance between the two subsamples for each of the 
four proximity metrics. Specifically, foreign firms originating from a proximate to the United 
States country in terms of distance, economic links, industrial structure, and culture exert higher 
competitive pressures on their U.S. rivals, which result in more significant performance losses of 
their U.S. rival firms. There are no statistical differences in U.S. firm performance between the 
treated and matched samples when foreign firms come from less proximate countries. This 
suggests, as expected, that the negative effects from foreign competition are higher when foreign 
firms originate from markets more familiar to U.S. investors.  
We note that there are 68 Canadian cross-listings out of the total of 270. This corresponds 
to 53 out of 181 events that contain at least one Canadian cross-listing. Since Canada is the 
closest country to the United States in geographic, economic, and cultural terms, over 90% of 
Canadian listings resides within the subsamples of high proximity measures. However, in 
unreported tests, we find that even with the exclusion of 53 Canadian cross-listing events, our 
results in Panel A of Table 7 remain qualitatively intact.    
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As argued in the vast prior literature (e.g., Stulz, 1999; Reese and Weisbach, 2002; 
Doidge et al., 2004, 2009; etc.), the foreign listing premium in the United States can be explained 
by the improvements in investor protection and information dissemination resulting from 
bonding to a host market with more stringent legal and disclosure standards. Many papers also 
find that foreign firms list on U.S. exchanges to seek greater liquidity in a larger market and 
achieve significant liquidity improvements after listing (Werner and Kleidon, 1996; Domowitz et 
al., 1998; Foerster and Karolyi, 1998). Finally, foreign-listed firms may prefer listing in the 
United States to make their disclosure standards in line with investor expectations (e.g., Biddle 
and Suadagaran, 1992). In other words, foreign firms benefit more from listing on U.S. 
exchanges if they come from countries with larger differences from the U.S. market in terms of 
market size and liquidity, investor protection, and disclosure standards. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that foreign-listed firms have more valuation gains if the U.S. market cap/GDP ratio, 
U.S. investor protection, U.S. disclosure standard, and U.S. market liquidity are all higher than 
the corresponding measure in the foreign firm’s home country. 
Panel B of Table 7 shows the results based on two market development and two market 
stringency characteristics of foreign listed firms, namely: market capitalization to GDP ratio 
(MkCap/GDP), market liquidity (Liquidity), investor protection (Rule of Law), and accounting 
disclosure standards (Disclosure). MkCap/GDP is a dummy that is equal to one if the U.S. 
market capitalization to GDP ratio is higher than that of the foreign country. Market 
capitalization is from Datastream and the Morningstar Dimson, Marsh, & Staunton global 
returns database. The real GDP values are from the historical statistics compiled by Angus 
Maddison.19 Liquidity is a dummy that is equal to one if the U.S. market liquidity is higher than 
that of the foreign country. Market liquidity is one minus the equally-weighted average ratio of 
zero daily returns each month across all firms in any given country from Goyenko and Sarkissian 
(2014) averaged for a given calendar year. The Rule of Law is a dummy that is equal to one if 
the U.S. investor protection is higher than that of the foreign country, and it is based on the anti-
                                                          
19 All GDP numbers are in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. 
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self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008). Disclosure is a dummy that is equal to one if the 
U.S. disclosure standards are higher than that of the foreign country, and is obtained from Bae, 
Tan, and Welker (2008). Indeed, consistent with most of our conjectures, we find that U.S. rival 
firms experiencing a foreign listing event show a lower operating performance relative to their 
peers if foreign listings have a higher U.S.–foreign market cap/GDP ratio, a higher U.S.–foreign 
liquidity ratio, and higher U.S.–foreign disclosure standards. Only the split of the sample by Rule 
of Law does not produce contrasting test results between the two subsamples.  
 
4.2. Industry and U.S. Firm Characteristics 
We now move to analyzing how U.S. rival firm underperformance varies across industry and 
firm characteristics. Here we follow the regression specification in column (1) of Table 6, Panel 
B. In Panel A of Table 8, we use the following three U.S. industry characteristics: 
competitiveness, foreign sales, and external finance. First, it is known that competition affects 
firm performance. For instance, Hoberg and Phillips (2010) find negative externality of industry 
competition on rivals’ cash flows and stock returns. We use the fitted Herfindahl–Hirschman 
Index (HHI) to measure the industry competition of “treated” industries, which is obtained from 
the Hoberg–Phillips database and available for SIC codes outside of manufacturing industries. 
An industry is defined as competitive if it is below the sample median. Second, foreign sales is 
the proportion of total foreign sales in the “treated” industry one year prior to the listing, 
computed as the total foreign sales scaled by the total sales in any given industry. Third, external 
finance measures the dependence of “treated” industries on external financing, as in Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), and is computed as capital expenditures minus cash flows from operations to 
capital expenditures at the industry level. Reese and Weisbach (2002) show that cross-listing 
eases foreign firm’s capital constraints by facilitating equity offerings in a deep and liquid stock 
market. Therefore, we expect industries that rely more on external financing to benefit more 
from cross-listing in the United States and, consequently, to exert higher competitive pressures 
on their U.S. peers. We split the sample at the median values of industry-level variables one year 
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prior to the listing events. We observe that U.S. rivals in more competitive industries, industries 
with a larger proportion of foreign sales and a greater reliance on external finance, experience 
more performance deterioration after foreign firm listings on U.S. exchanges.  
In Panel B of Table 8, we consider the following six U.S. firm characteristics: market 
share, size, age, IPO issuance, the number of business segments (conglomerate or not), and sales 
geography (purely U.S. or not). It is known that smaller firms and firms with limited market 
share are less immune to rivalry, more prone to financial distress, and may have less growth due 
to such disadvantages as low economies of scale or insufficient quality signaling (e.g., Buzzell et 
al., 1975; Smallwood and Conlick, 1979; Ortiz-Molina and Phillips, 2014). Also, younger firms 
usually have less means to resist negative competition effects than more established firms, and 
thus their performance should suffer more from foreign listings. Next, since both IPOs and cross-
listings occur in waves (see Maksimovic and Pichler, 2001; Sarkissian and Schill, 2016) foreign 
listing placements may take place around intensive IPO introduction periods. Therefore, it is 
important to verify that our main findings are independent of the simultaneous issuance of IPOs 
by U.S. firms. Also, multi-segment U.S. rivals should be more immune to the competitive effects 
from their foreign peers. When one of their divisions becomes more exposed to cross-listed 
rivals, such firms can allocate more resources to other segments in different industries that are 
not affected by foreign listings (Stein, 1997; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2002; Schoar, 2002). 
Finally, one may expect that purely domestic U.S. rivals that operate and sale their products only 
within the U.S. market, would suffer more from competition than comparable firms with global 
sales, since these firms are known to be more risky (Michel and Shaked, 1986). We obtain the 
IPO dates for “treated” firms from Compustat. The IPO sample includes those “treated” firms 
which experience IPO issuance in the listing event year or within one or two years before the 
listing event year. Conglomerate is defined as the U.S. firms with more than one business 
segment. Purely U.S. firm is defined as the U.S. firms only selling to U.S. domestic market and 
having no foreign sales. These data are also from Compustat Segment Files. 
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The estimation results based on the above U.S. firm characteristics are consistent with 
expectations. The negative performance impact of foreign firms listed in U.S. markets is more 
profound on those U.S. rivals that have low market share, small market capitalization, and are 
young. Also, as expected, U.S. rivals operating within single business segment and with U.S. 
sales only again suffer more from listing of their foreign competitors in the U.S. market. 
Importantly, a significantly negative impact is also present among firms that do not issue IPOs at 
the time of listing on U.S. exchanges their foreign competitors. Note that even though the 
interaction term is insignificant for IPO issuing firms (due to their much small sample size) its 
coefficient is only slightly lower than that for non-IPO firms (-0.093 vs. -0.128). This effectively 
shows that the foreign listing effect may reinforce the long-run underperformance of firms 
issuing IPOs.  
 
5. Foreign Determinants of U.S. Rival Firm Underperformance 
In this section, we further investigate three impact channels through which the listings of foreign 
firms affect U.S. rival companies. To explain the performance decline of U.S. rivals after the 
listings of foreign firms in U.S. markets, we examine the relationship between cross-sectional 
differences in the underperformance of U.S. competitors and foreign firms’ competitive 
(financial, growth, and visibility) advantages after cross-listing. We measure competitive 
advantages of foreign firms using foreign firm characteristics in the year of listing. We expect to 
see that foreign firms with stronger financial gains, more rapid product market penetration, and 
higher visibility among investors will lead to more obvious declines in the performance of their 
U.S. counterparts. Recall from Section 3.2 that the financial gains of foreign firms are measured 
by their Tobin’s Q, U.S. equity issuance, and U.S. target acquisition; product market penetration 
by foreign firms’ total asset growth, total sales growth, and capital expenditures following the 
listings; and visibility by whether foreign firms are held by institutional block holders, whether 
they are followed by analysts, and their trading volume in the listing year. We split our sample 
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by the median values of these firm characteristics and conduct multivariate tests on the impact of 
the financial, growth, and visibility channels of U.S. industry rivals around listing events using 
the DID method and the framework of model (4) with EBIT as our performance measure. 
Table 9 presents the test results from the three impact channels on U.S. incumbents. All 
the subsample splits use the DID regression in column (1) of Table 6, Panel B. Panel A 
illustrates how U.S. rival firms’ underperformance after foreign firms’ listing events is impacted 
by foreign firms’ financial gains. Consistent with our conjecture, we find that U.S. rivals’ 
underperformance is more evident in the events in which foreign-listed firms exhibit higher 
financial gains, as measured by their market valuation (Tobin’s Q). Specifically, the performance 
decline of U.S. incumbent firms is negative and statistically significant in the events in which 
foreign-listed firms show a higher Q. Furthermore, we find that U.S. incumbents experience 
more significant performance losses if foreign-listed firms adopt an equity-financed expansion 
strategy through U.S. equity issuance or target acquisition. The last four columns of Panel A 
show that the deterioration of the financial performance of U.S. competitors is more negative in 
the events in which foreign-listed firms either issue equity on U.S. exchanges or undertake a U.S. 
target acquisition after the listing. For example, the coefficient in the subsample of events in 
which foreign firms issue equity is twice as large as the coefficient in the subsample of events, in 
which foreign firms do not issue equity. This evidence is consistent with our conjecture that U.S. 
rivals experience more deterioration in their operating performance when foreign-listed firms 
achieve greater financial advantages from their U.S. cross-listings. We also note that the 
coefficient on PL×Treated is statistically significant in the subsamples of events in which 
foreign-listed firms do not acquire U.S. targets. These results imply that the various financial 
benefits of cross-listing that foreign firms obtain in the United States impact the competition 
dynamics in the U.S. market and drive down the performance of their U.S. rivals. 
Panel B of Table 9 illustrates the effect of foreign firms on U.S. rivals’ performance 
through the growth channel. We unequivocally observe that U.S. rivals significantly 
underperform their matched firms in the events in which foreign-listed firms have higher total 
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asset growth and total sales growth. In contrast, PL×Treated is not statistically significant in the 
subsamples of events in which foreign-listed firms have lower total asset growth or lower total 
sales growth. This implies that foreign-listed firms experiencing higher growth in assets or sales 
exert more pressure on U.S. incumbent firms’ operating performance. In addition, we show that 
the effect of foreign listings on U.S. competitors is particularly pronounced among those foreign-
listed firms that have high capital investments. This implies that foreign firms that are more 
likely to benefit from U.S. listing through investment expansion have a stronger negative impact 
on their U.S. counterparts’ financial performance. In economic terms, across all growth metrics, 
high-growth foreign firms reduce U.S. rivals’ EBIT within two years from the pre-event levels 
relative to their matching firms by as much as 37%. These findings are consistent with our 
argument that foreign listing facilitates the product market penetration of foreign-listed firms in 
the host market, subsequently leading to declines in the performance of U.S. rival firms.  
In Panel C of Table 9, we turn to the increased prominence/visibility of foreign-listed 
firms to investors in the U.S. market and the impact of this on the financial performance of their 
U.S. rivals. We observe that the financial performance of U.S. rival firms is more negatively 
affected in the post-listing period in the events in which the foreign-listed firms are more visible 
to investors, namely, they are held by at least one institutional block holder, followed by at least 
one financial analyst, or have a higher trading volume in the listing year. For example, U.S. rival 
firms’ EBIT declines by 27–50% within the two-year period following the listing year in the 
subsamples of foreign-listed firms with higher visibility. However, less visible foreign firms, as 
measured by any visibility metrics, exert less competitive pressures on U.S. domiciled 
companies. These findings are consistent with arguments that foreign firms listed on U.S. 
exchanges increase their prominence in the U.S. market by gaining the attention of the media and 
changes in investor recognition (Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver, 2002; Lang et al., 2003; Ahearne 
et al., 2004). This implies that listing in the United States enables foreign firms to capitalize on 
their product market reputation, which changes the competition dynamics in the U.S. market and 
imposes negative externality on the operating performance of U.S. rivals. 
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Thus, Table 9 highlights a significant relationship between cross-sectional differences in 
the underperformance of U.S. competitors and the foreign firms’ competitive advantages that 
they obtain through U.S. listings, namely: financial gains, product market penetration, and 
increased visibility. Our results suggest that the underperformance of U.S. incumbents is related 
to all three of these determinants.20 
 
6. Competitive Effects of Foreign Listings versus Alternative Explanations 
Our analysis effectively shows that foreign listing events have a unique and long-lasting impact 
on rival U.S. firms’ stock returns and other performance metrics. A natural question to ask is 
whether the documented impact on U.S. firms is indeed associated explicitly with the listing of 
their foreign competitors on U.S. exchanges. We address these concerns below.21 
 
6.1. The Market Timing Alternative 
One of the alternative interpretations for our main finding is market timing. Foreign firms may 
pursue U.S. cross-listings when their U.S. product market rivals are highly valued.  
Subsequently, their U.S. competitors underperform after the booming period. In other words, our 
finding that U.S. incumbent firms experience performance deterioration after the massive entry 
of foreign-listed firms may not be driven by competitive pressures exerted by the foreign-listed 
firms but rather by the timing of foreign firms to cross-list in the United States at high market or 
industry valuation cycles. Indeed, Sarkissian and Schill (2016) find that cross-listing waves 
cluster in time, countries, and industries, and they largely coincide with the outperformance of 
host country’s economy and financial markets. Hoberg and Phillips (2010) show that in 
competitive industries high industry-level valuations are followed by sharply lower operating 
                                                          
20 In the Internet Appendix, consistent with Table 9 results, we shows that cross-listings from foreign firms that gain 
high financial benefits, experience high growth and/or achieve high visibility in the U.S. exchanges lead to 
significantly more negative U.S. rivals’ market reaction. 
21 In the Internet Appendix we also test the Heckman (1979) two-stage model to determine whether self-selection 
bias affects our findings. These tests show that this bias cannot explain our findings on the underperformance of 
their U.S. rivals. 
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cash flows and abnormal stock returns. The long-term financial performance analysis around the 
foreign listing events may be driven by the negative relation between industry valuation and 
subsequent firm performance. To address this concern, we use the U.S. rivals’ short-run CARs 
as the dependent variable and test how they vary with market-wide or industry valuation cycles 
around the listing dates. The short-run rivals’ CARs are measured at the daily frequency, 
spanning from 20 days before the listing date to 20 days after the listing date (as in Table 2, 
Panel A), hence, they are unlikely to be affected by any long-term valuation trends. Therefore, if 
aggregate market or industry valuation timing drives our results, then the rivals’ short-run CARs 
around the foreign listings should be particularly strong for those cross-listings that occur at the 
peaks of market and/or industry valuation cycles.  
Following Sarkissian and Schill (2016), we compute three metrics that capture aggregate 
market valuation cycles: foreign listing intensity, foreign listing intensity weighted by the total 
assets, and U.S. real GDP growth rate. Foreign listing intensity, FL_Intensity, is computed as the 
three-year moving-average of the proportion of new foreign listing placements in the U.S. 
exchanges. Foreign listing intensity based on the total assets, FL_Intensity_TA, is computed as 
the three-year moving average of the percentage of total assets of new foreign-listed firms 
relative to the total assets of all foreign-listed firms in the sample period. The U.S. real GDP 
growth, Real_GDP, is the three-year moving average of log growth rate of the annual GDP in 
2009 dollars. The annual U.S. GDP data comes from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).  
We also construct several measures of industry valuation cycle. The first measure, 
Industry_M/B, is the industry average market to book ratio, computed as average market to book 
ratios across all firms in an industry. The second, Resid_M/B(1), is from Pastor and Veronesi 
(2003) valuation model. For each year, we regress the log of the market-to-book ratio, log(M/B), 
on minus the reciprocal of one plus firm age, a dividend dummy, firm leverage, the log of total 
assets, current firm ROE, and the volatility of profitability for each firm. Next, we estimate the 
residual M/B as the difference between log(M/B) and predicted log(M/B) from the model, then 
take the average across all firms in an industry. The third, Resid_M/B(2), follows Rhodes-Kropf 
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et al. (2005). For each industry in each year, we regress log market value of equity on log book 
value of equity, log of net income if it is positive (zero otherwise), log of the absolute value of 
net income if net income is negative (zero otherwise), and firm leverage. Then we compute the 
average residual M/B across all the firms in an industry. The fourth, Resid_M/B(3), is from 
Hoberg and Phillips (2010). We again estimate the Pastor and Veronesi (2003) valuation model, 
but this time using the rolling window data for the past ten years for all firms in an industry. 
Then we take the industry average of residual M/B. The last fifth measure is the industry level 
stock returns, computed as value-weighted average returns across all firms in an industry.  
Table 10 shows the results of cross-sectional tests on the short-run portfolio returns of 
U.S. incumbent rivals to foreign listings during the aggregate market (Panel A) and industry 
valuation cycles (Panel B). The dependent variable is the industry-level portfolio returns of U.S. 
rival firms over the (-20, +20) day window estimated from the Fama-French three-factor model, 
as shown in Table 2 Panel A. 22 The portfolio return is the equally-weighted average of stock 
returns across all U.S. industry competitors in the same 4-digit SIC code for a given foreign 
listing. In Panel A, the dummy variables are equal to one if the foreign listing occurred in years 
in which the market valuation measures are below the sample median, and zero otherwise. In 
Panel B, the dummy variables are equal to one for the foreign listings in each industry-year in 
which the industry valuation measures are below the industry median during the sample period. 
Panel A shows that the coefficients on all three indicator variables of low market valuation 
periods are negative and significant at the 5% or 1% levels. Likewise, all five point estimates of 
low industry valuation periods in Panel B are negative and significant at the 1% level. This 
implies that CARs of U.S. rivals are more negative in periods of low market or industry valuation 
rather than in high valuation times. 
Thus, Table 10 shows that the performance deterioration of U.S. rival firms is not driven 
merely by the timing of foreign listing decision with high market or industry valuation periods in 
                                                          
22 We obtain qualitatively similar results when U.S. rivals’ CARs are estimated based on the CAPM or Cahrart 
(1997) four-factor model. 
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the U.S market. Instead, the above tests reaffirm that the competitive effects of foreign firm 
listings on U.S. exchanges themselves matter the most for the subsequent underperformance of 
their U.S. counterparts. 
 
6.2. The Existing Competition in Product Markets Alternative 
We now examine the strength of the observed negative impact of foreign-listed firms on U.S. 
rivals depending on the physical presence of foreign firms or their products on the U.S. soil. It is 
possible that cross-listings of foreign firms do not change the competition dynamics in the U.S. 
market; rather they simply reflect the existing expansion of those firms in the United States.  
To determine whether the foreign listing dates of the U.S. competitors that we identified 
indeed have a unique valuation impact on U.S. firms, we conduct short-run CAR tests of rival 
U.S. firms for various periods before the cross-listing dates. If the negative valuation impact on 
U.S. rivals that we documented is driven by the existing competition of foreign firms in U.S. 
product markets and is unrelated to their foreign listing placements (e.g., in product markets), 
then we should expect a similar impact on U.S. counterparts from foreign-listed firms even 
before their actual listing events. 
 Figure 2 shows the estimation results. We report the CARs (in percent) of U.S. 
incumbent firms for the same short-run window of (–30; +30) days as before for two periods 
before the actual listing date: 6 and 12 months. We do not consider the period of 1–3 months 
before the listing because of the potential convolution of our results with (i) the announcement 
effect of a foreign listing, which occurs on average about 6 weeks prior to the listing placement 
(see Foerster and Karolyi, 1999), and (ii) other potential leakages of preannouncement 
information. For the ease of comparison, we also reproduce the corresponding CARs for the 
listing event from Figure 1A. We can observe that, unlike CARs around the actual foreign listing 
dates, those CARs 6 and 12 months before the listing do not show any significant declines over 
the estimation window. Thus, Figure 2 illustrates that the impact of foreign-listed firms on U.S. 
rivals that we documented earlier is unique in a timeline. It is not driven by the continuous 
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influence of foreign firms outside of their listing decision; rather, cross-listings do indeed change 
the competition dynamics in their host market and exert pressures on U.S. rivals. 
 
6.3. The Market Entry Alternative 
The foreign listings may accompany with the entry of foreign firms into U.S. market via 
increasing their physical presence in the United States after the listing, e.g., by establishing more 
sales offices, building more factories, and/or opening more chain stores. In other words, another 
alternative explanation for our findings is that the documented competitive effects on U.S. rivals 
are associated solely with the foreign firms’ market entry but not with their listings on U.S. 
exchanges. If this hypothesis is true, then we should not see a negative market response from 
U.S. incumbent firms to cross listing from foreign firms that announced their entry into the U.S. 
market at a date prior to their listing date. To conduct this falsification test, we separate our 
sample into foreign listing firms that enter into U.S. market prior to their listing date, i.e., those 
with physical presence of a foreign business in the United States prior to their listings, and those 
that do not have a business presence in the U.S. market at the time of listing. 
However, verifying the physical presence of a foreign business in the United States is not 
an easy task.23 Nevertheless, we have collected information on the physical presence of a foreign 
business in the United States for all our 270 listings in the 181 foreign listing events.24 From our 
event selection, those 270 listings are identified as the most impactful ones. We verify all the 
foreign listed firms’ company history, Wikipedia webpages, SEC filings, and news articles, to 
identify whether they have a sales office, headquarters, or subsidiaries in the United States prior 
to the listing on U.S. exchanges. If a foreign firm has already established its sales office, 
                                                          
23 First, there is no universal database that provides such information. Compustat gives information on geographical 
segments, but most of it is only available after a foreign firm lists on a U.S. exchange. Also, it has non-uniformed 
categories of geographic segments, e.g., domestic versus non-domestic, or North American versus Asia, that cannot 
provide sufficient information to verify a foreign firm presence in the U.S. market. Second, it is equally challenging 
to locate such information through a news search. Except for large foreign firms, we are unable to verify if a foreign 
listed firm has any business in the United States either through the company history on the company’s website or 
through news article searchers like Factiva. Some firms were delisted or acquired several years after listing, which 
create additional hurdles in achieving any information on their presence in U.S. market prior to listings. 
24 The information collection is very difficult if we turn to smaller foreign listed firms outside our 181 events.  
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headquarters, or a subsidiary in the U.S. market, then it can be viewed as a direct competitor to 
U.S. rivals. In total, we could verify information for 248 cross-listed foreign firms, 189 of which 
have a U.S. presence. Therefore, 22 listings are removed from this test. After the verification, we 
analyze the short-run portfolio returns and long-run performance for the foreign listings from 
foreign firms that listed their equity shares prior to or after their entry into U.S. market. 
The test results are shown in Table 11. Panel A reports the rivals’ CARs for two data 
subsamples: the first subsample accounts only for foreign firms that do not have U.S. business 
presence; the second subsample contains foreign firms that are present in the U.S. product 
market prior to their listings on U.S. exchanges. Similar to Table 2, we show the CARs of U.S. 
incumbents over four short-run windows around the foreign listing events: (–5; +5), (–10; +10), 
(–20; +20), and (–30; +30) days. Again, we also show the number of portfolios and the p-value 
of average CARs. Our estimations reveal that foreign firms that already have physical presence 
in the U.S. market by the time of listing experience much more negative and significant impact 
on their U.S. rivals.  As an additional test, we also present the U.S. rivals’ long-run performance 
in the two subsamples in Panel B of Table 11. The regression follows Table 6 Panel B, Column 
1. The test results again confirm that U.S. rivals suffer more in the long-run when cross-listed 
foreign firms already have U.S. presence at the time of listing. Therefore, Table 11 implies that 
our findings of U.S. incumbent rivals’ negative market response to foreign listings are not driven 
by the market entry effect of foreign listed firms. 
 
7. Conclusions 
Using a large sample of listing and delisting events of foreign firms on and from U.S. exchanges 
between 1950 and 2011, we examine the short-run and long-run impacts of these events on rival 
U.S. firms. We find that foreign listings have an economically and statistically significant 
influence on U.S. firms belonging to the same industries. This impact is negative and leads to the 
underperformance of incumbent U.S. firms. Moreover, using the DID methodology between the 
treated and the matched samples of firms, we find that treated U.S. firms also underperform in 
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terms of aggregate operating performance, such as EBIT and market share. In contrast, the effect 
from delisting events of foreign firms is positive but mild and short-lived. Our results are not 
driven by market timing, the existing competition dynamics in the U.S. market, or the market 
entry effect of foreign-listed firms, and are immune to the sample selection bias.   
We further show that the impact of foreign listings on U.S. rival firms varies depending 
on the market, industry, and U.S. firm characteristics. U.S. rivals suffer more from foreign 
listings when foreign firms originate from markets familiar to the United States and from 
countries with larger differences to U.S. markets in terms of financial development and 
disclosure standards. At the industry level, we find that firms in more competitive industries, 
with high levels of foreign sales and external finance, suffer more from the listings of their 
foreign rivals on U.S. exchanges. At the firm level, small and young firms, as well as firms with 
lower market shares, operating within only one business segment and with sales only in the U.S. 
market are more vulnerable to the competition pressures of foreign competitors and thus 
experience more profound drops in operating performance. In addition, our results hold for U.S. 
firms with and without IPO issuance. 
We relate the underperformance of U.S. rivals to three impact channels from foreign 
firms that list on U.S. exchanges: financial, growth, and visibility. In particular, we find that 
foreign firms with high valuations and those that issue equity or undertake acquisitions in the 
United States immediately following the listing induce an economically and statistically 
significant reduction in rival U.S. firms’ performance. Furthermore, we find that foreign firms 
with good growth prospects, such as those with high asset and sales growth, and capital 
expenditure, exert more competition pressures on their U.S. peer firms. We also show that 
foreign firms with higher prominence (visual and physical presence) in the U.S. market inflict 
more performance losses on U.S. incumbent firms. Our evidence suggests that, through foreign 
listing placements, international capital markets provide an important venue that greatly affects 
the performance dynamics of local firms, their corporate decisions, and, therefore, the host 
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Distribution of foreign listings in the United States 
 
Panel A: Distribution of foreign listings across countries and time 
Country 1950-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2011 Total 
Argentina     16 4 20 
Australia  1  15 16 12 44 
Austria     1  1 
Belgium     4 2 6 
Bolivia    1   1 
Brazil     6 9 15 
Canada 2 38 25 226 289 166 746 
Chile    1 22 2 25 
China     15 14 29 
Colombia     1 1 2 
Denmark    1 5 1 7 
Domin. Rep.     1  1 
Finland    1 5 1 7 
France    3 31 9 43 
Germany   1  24 9 34 
Ghana     1  1 
Greece     4 3 7 
Hong Kong     11 4 15 
Hungary     1  1 
Iceland     1  1 
India    1 8 8 17 
Indonesia     5  5 
Ireland    3 24 7 34 
Israel  2 2 22 97 29 152 
Italy    4 11 1 16 
Japan  1 18 5 9 8 41 
Jordan     1  1 
Korea     9 8 17 
Luxembourg   1 1 10 7 19 
Mexico  1 1  35 7 44 
Netherlands 2   8 38 14 62 
New Zealand    1 8 1 10 
Norway    2 8 2 12 
Peru     3  3 
Philippines  4   2 1 7 
Poland     1  1 
Portugal     3  3 
Russia     5 3 8 
Singapore    1 7 2 10 
South Africa  1 7 3 8 2 21 
Spain    5 4 3 12 
Sweden   1 5 13 2 21 
Switzerland  1 1 1 13 7 23 
Taiwan    1 5 2 8 
Turkey     1  1 
U.K. 1 9 5 40 99 25 179 
Venezuela     4  4 





Table 1 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Distribution of foreign delistings across countries and time 
Country 1950-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2011 Total 
Argentina     1 3 4 
Australia     5 10 15 
Austria      1 1 
Belgium     1 1 2 
Brazil      1 1 
Canada  1 2 66 123 78 270 
Chile      4 4 
China      3 3 
Denmark     2 2 4 
Dom. Rep.      1 1 
Finland      2 2 
France     1 13 14 
Germany     2 15 17 
Greece      2 2 
Hong Kong     1 4 5 
Hungary      1 1 
Iceland      1 1 
India      3 3 
Indonesia     1 2 3 
Ireland     1 6 7 
Israel    2 9 25 36 
Italy     1  1 
Japan     1 7 8 
Korea      4 4 
Luxembourg      5 5 
Mexico     7 7 14 
Netherlands     4 15 19 
New Zealand     1 2 3 
Norway      2 2 
Peru      2 2 
Philippines     1 2 3 
Poland      1 1 
South Africa     2 1 3 
Spain      2 2 
Sweden     1 10 11 
Switzerland      1 1 
Taiwan      1 1 
U.K.    6 13 30 49 
Venezuela      1 1 
Total 0 1 2 74 178 271 526 
This table provides the distribution of foreign listings on (Panels A) and delistings from (Panel B) U.S. exchanges in 
the 1950-2011 period across countries and time. The foreign listing data come from several sources: Bank of New 





Cumulative abnormal returns of rival U.S. firms around foreign firm listing and delisting 
 
Panel A: Short-run CARs 
 Listings Delistings 
Window (days) # Portfolios CAR (%) P-value # Portfolios CAR (%) P-value 
(-5, +5) 1,568 -0.713*** 0.000 498 0.252 0.277 
(-10,+10) 1,568 -0.949*** 0.000 498 0.802* 0.086 
(-20,+20) 1,568 -2.050*** 0.000 498 1.507** 0.031 
(-30,+30) 1,568 -1.772*** 0.000 498 1.370* 0.072 
 
Panel B: Long-run CARs 
 Listings Delistings 
Window (months) # Portfolios CAR (%) P-value # Portfolios CAR (%) P-value 
(0, +6) 1,567 -4.176*** 0.000 498 -0.642 0.352 
(0, +12) 1,567 -7.860*** 0.000 498 -1.169 0.317 
(0, +18) 1,567 -11.549*** 0.000 498 -0.121 0.485 
(0, +24) 1,567 -15.964*** 0.000 498 -0.729 0.423 
This table shows the average portfolio cumulative abnormal returns, CARs (in percent), of U.S. competing firms 
around listing and delisting dates of foreign firms, as well as the p-values of the average CARs in each event 
window. The sample period is 1950-2011. Panel A shows the short-run CARs and the event window is in days. 
Panel B shows the long-run CARs and the event window is in months. The CARs are calculated based on the Fama-
French three-factor model using portfolio returns for each industry competitor. The portfolio return is the equally-
weighted average of stock returns across all U.S. industry competitors in the same 4-digit SIC code for a given 








Descriptive statistics of foreign listed and incumbent U.S. firms 
 
Panel A: Distribution of cross-listing events  
Industry 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000 2001-2011 Total 
AGR    1  1 
CST    5  5 
FIN   1 9 2 12 
MFC 2 6 18 57 21 104 
MNG    5 4 9 
SPA   1 11 5 17 
TRD   1 5 4 10 
TSP   3 12 8 23 
Total 2 6 24 105 44 181 
 
Panel B: Foreign firms 
 Obs. Mean Median P10 P90 SD 
Tobin’s Q 212 2.856 1.344 0.605 5.595 5.336 
U.S. Equity Issuance (D) 270 0.215 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.411 
U.S. Acquisition (D) 270 0.185 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.389 
Asset Growth 223 0.332 0.183 -0.029 0.957 0.478 
Sales Growth 218 0.263 0.166 -0.083 0.702 0.585 
Capital Expenditure 212 0.155 0.089 0.023 0.382 0.201 
Institutional Holdings (D) 270 0.137 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.345 
Analyst Coverage (D) 270 0.248 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.433 
Trading volume 261 0.173 0.118 0.006 0.401 0.180 
 
Panel C: U.S. incumbent firms vs foreign firms  
 U.S. Rival Firms Foreign Firms   
 Obs. Mean SD Obs. Mean SD  Diff (F-US) t-stat 
EBIT 1,742 -0.161 2.018 238 -0.120 1.997  0.041 0.30 
Market Share 1,742 0.056 0.117 242 0.123 0.184  0.067     7.69*** 
Assets (billions) 1,742 3.118 17.676 262 16.169 66.781  13.051     6.74*** 
Age (years) 1,742 18.508 16.666 NA NA NA  NA NA 
Leverage 1,742 0.178 0.197 234 0.192 0.186  0.014 1.03 
M/B 1,742 0.649 0.554 237 0.571 0.500  -0.078    2.05** 





Table 3 (continued) 
   
This table reports the summary statistics of firm characteristics for incumbent U.S. firms and foreign firms listed in 
the U.S. The sample period is 1950-2011. Accounting information is from Compustat and stock market information 
is from CRSP. All firm characteristics are collected at the end of effective listing year of foreign firms on U.S. 
exchanges. Panel A shows the distribution of cross-listing events over industries and time. The eight industries are: 
AGR – Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing; MNG – Mining; CST – Construction; MFC – Manufacturing; TSP – 
Transportation; TRD – Wholesale and Retail Trade; FIN – Finance, Insurance and Real Estate; SPA – Services and 
Public Administration. The effective foreign listing event is defined as follows. First, we measure the importance of 
foreign listings by the relative ratio of the total assets of foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges to that of U.S. rivals 
and select those industry-years in which such ratio exceeds five percent (one percent, ten percent). Then, the foreign 
listing event is identified as an industry-year that is not preceded by or followed by a larger impact of foreign 
listings within four years around the event year. For the 5% relative ratio there are 181 events during the sample 
period representing 270 foreign listing placements and matching with 1,742 U.S. incumbents. Panel B shows foreign 
firm characteristics. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of total asset and market values of the firm less its book value over the 
total asset value. U.S. Equity Issuance (D) is a dummy for the U.S. equity issuance within a year after foreign listing 
placement. U.S. Acquisition (D) is a dummy for the U.S. firm takeover within two years of the foreign firm listing 
on a U.S. exchange. Asset Growth is computed as the percentage change in total assets (in logs). Sales Growth is 
computed as the percentage change in total sales (in logs). Institutional Holdings is a dummy variable, which is 
equal to one if a foreign firm is held by at least one block institutional holder, and is zero otherwise. Analyst 
Coverage is a dummy variable, which is equal to one if a foreign firm is followed by at least one analyst and zero 
otherwise. Trading Volume is computed as the total shares traded in the listing year divided by the total shares 
outstanding. U.S. Business Presence is a dummy variable, which is equal one if a foreign firm has a sales office, 
headquarters, or subsidiaries in the United States. Panel C shows the performance and other characteristics of U.S. 
incumbent firms versus foreign firms. EBIT is the earnings before interest and taxes normalized by firm sales. 
Market Share is the firm’s sales divided by the total industry sales, including the sales of foreign listed firms. Assets 
is the firm’s total assets (in $bln). Age is the total number of years since the firms’ first trading date on a U.S. 
exchange. Leverage is the long-term debt divided by the sum of long-term debt and market value of equity. M/B is 
the firm’s market-to-book ratio computed as market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Cash is the 
sum of cash holdings and short term investments divided by total assets. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 
99%. P10 and P90 are the 10th and the 90th percentiles of the distribution, respectively. SD is the standard deviation. 
The last two columns of Panel C show the difference in the means of for each characteristic between foreign and 
U.S. firms, Diff (F-US), and the corresponding absolute t-statistic. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 






Multivariate analysis of rival U.S. firms’ overall financial performance 
 
 
5% asset ratio 
(Foreign/U.S.) 
1% asset ratio 
(Foreign/U.S.) 
10% asset ratio 
(Foreign/U.S.) 
 EBIT MkShr EBIT MkShr EBIT MkShr 
PL -0.121** -0.004** -0.093** -0.002* -0.156** -0.005* 
 (2.22) (2.14) (2.39) (1.69) (2.17) (1.78) 
Log(Assets) 0.137*** 0.032*** 0.133*** 0.033*** 0.157*** 0.032*** 
 (5.23) (17.29) (5.96) (18.62) (4.75) (16.44) 
Log(Age) 0.032 0.007*** 0.001 0.008*** 0.071 0.007** 
 (0.75) (3.38) (0.02) (3.92) (1.25) (2.53) 
Leverage -0.120 -0.022** -0.193* -0.024** -0.092 -0.014 
 (0.87) (2.13) (1.74) (2.22) (0.54) (1.20) 
M/B -0.008 -0.009*** 0.034 -0.006** -0.025 -0.010*** 
 (0.12) (2.95) (0.69) (2.37) (0.27) (3.03) 
Cash -1.025*** -0.008** -0.959*** -0.007** -1.200*** -0.006 
 (3.88) (2.25) (4.62) (2.16) (3.85) (1.56) 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 6,968 6,968 10,244 10,244 5,236 5,236 
Adj. R2 0.15 0.54 0.15 0.52 0.16 0.56 
This table shows the results of panel regressions of U.S. incumbent firms’ overall financial performance metrics on 
the foreign listing dummy and relevant control variables. The sample period is 1950-2011. Accounting information 
is from Compustat and the stock market information is from CRSP. The effective foreign listing event is defined as 
in Table 3. EBIT is the earnings before interest and taxes normalized by firm sales. MkShr is the firm’s sales divided 
by total industry sales, including the sales of foreign listed firms. PL is the post-listing dummy equal to one for the 
two years after the foreign listing year and to zero for the two years before the foreign listing year. Other 
independent variables are defined as in Table 3. All regressions include an unreported intercept, year, and industry 
fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at industry-year level. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. The 
table also reports the number of observations and the adjusted R-squared. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 






Comparison of firm characteristics between rival and matched U.S. firms 
 
Panel A: Matching firms and treated firms one year before the listing events 
Matching Variables Group Obs. Mean P25 Median P75 Diff (M-T) 
Log(Assets) Treated 1,742 5.431 3.818 5.175 6.921 0.003 
 Matched 1,742 5.433 3.883 5.274 6.845 [0.990] 
Log(Age) Treated 1,742 4.890 4.190 4.938 5.679 0.041 
 Matched 1,742 4.932 4.233 5.021 5.722 [0.629] 
Leverage Treated 1,742 0.174 0.004 0.106 0.298 -0.001 
 Matched 1,742 0.173 0.005 0.105 0.290 [0.979] 
M/B Treated 1,742 0.635 0.297 0.490 0.797 -0.008 
 Matched 1,742 0.627 0.302 0.494 0.800 [0.834] 
Cash Treated 1,742 0.218 0.022 0.079 0.278 -0.017 
 Matched 1,742 0.201 0.020 0.068 0.249 [0.671] 
ROA Treated 1,742 0.106 0.065 0.124 0.183 0.009 
 Matched 1,742 0.115 0.080 0.128 0.182 [0.524] 
 
Panel B: Growth opportunities between matching firms and treated firms one year before the listing  
Matching Variables Group Obs. Mean P25 Median P75 Diff (M-T) 
Earnings Estimates Treated 738 0.912 0.323 0.698 1.303 0.021
 Matched 738 0.933 0.388 0.758 1.313 [0.872]
LT EPS Growth Treated 592 16.781 11.203 15.229 20.307 -0.618
 Matched 592 16.163 11.370 14.642 19.508 [0.571]
Analyst Recommendation Treated 540 2.109 1.718 2.090 2.466 -0.058
  Matched 540 2.051 1.698 2.018 2.410 [0.286]
Sales Growth Treated 1,742 0.157 0.023 0.116 0.262 -0.014
 Matched 1,742 0.142 0.026 0.100 0.216 [0.607]
Total Assets Growth Treated 1,742 0.150 0.004 0.094 0.219 -0.004







Table 5 (continued) 
 
This table shows the univariate comparison of firm characteristics between U.S. firms in industry experiencing 
foreign listing events and similar U.S. firms in industries that do not experience any foreign listing event one year 
prior to the listing event year. Panel A presents the univariate comparison for the matching variables and Panel B 
presents the univariate comparison of various proxies of growth opportunities. We define firms that operate in 
industries experiencing a foreign listing event in the listing year as the “treated” firms. We select a “matched” firm 
for each of 1,742 U.S. rivals from “non-treated” firms based on their key characteristics one year before the event. 
The sample consists of 1,742 treated and 1,742 matched firms. Following Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and 
Weisbenner (2012), the matching metrics includes firm size (logarithm of total asset), growth opportunities (market-
to-book ratio), leverage, cash holdings, and ROA during the year that precedes the events. The matching algorithm 
that minimizes the Mahalanobis distance across all matching characteristics selecting the closest neighbor as a 
match. Specifically, for each treated firm i, a matched firm j is such that the Mahalanobis distance is given by: ||Xi – 
Xj|| = ((Xi – Xj)’ (Xi – Xj))
1/2, where X is a k-dimensional vector of covariates and  is the inverse of the 
covariance matrix of the covariates. Assets is the firm’s total assets (in logs). M/B is the firm’s market-to-book ratio 
computed as market value of equity divided by the book value of equity. Age is the total number of years since the 
firms’ first trading date on a U.S. exchange (in logs). Leverage is the long-term debt divided by the sum of long-
term debt and market value of equity. Cash is the sum of cash holdings and short term investments divided by total 
assets. ROA is the return on assets computed as the firm’s revenue minus total operating expenses divided by total 
assets. There are six different proxies for firms’ growth opportunities: Earnings estimates, which is the average 
earnings per share (EPS) estimates from I/B/E/S for the next fiscal year; Analyst Recommendations, which is the 
average recommendation from I/B/E/S measured on a five-point scale; LT EPS growth from I/B/E/S, which is the 
average long-term earnings growth rate estimated for the next five-year period; Sales Growth, which is the 
percentage growth of sales in logs; and Total Asset Growth, which is the percentage growth of total assets in logs. 
The last columns show the difference between “treated” firms and “matched” firms, and the p-values from t-test on 










Difference-in-difference analysis of rival U.S. firms’ overall financial performance 
 
Panel A: Industry and year fixed effects 
 
5% asset ratio 
(Foreign/U.S.) 
1% asset ratio 
(Foreign/U.S.) 
10% asset ratio 
(Foreign/U.S.) 
 EBIT MkShr EBIT MkShr EBIT MkShr 
PL×Treated -0.176*** -0.008*** -0.111*** -0.007*** -0.203*** -0.009*** 
 (2.85) (3.86) (2.64) (4.84) (2.74) (3.71) 
Treated = 1 0.273*** -0.033*** 0.086 -0.020*** 0.267*** 0.006 
 (3.27) (2.99) (1.48) (3.08) (3.16) (0.61) 
Intercept/Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 13,936 13,936 20,488 20,488 10,472 10,472 
Adj. R2 0.38 0.75 0.39 0.72 0.47 0.75 
 
Panel B: Firm and year fixed effects  
 
5% asset ratio 
(Foreign/U.S.) 
1% asset ratio 
(Foreign/U.S.) 
10% asset ratio 
(Foreign/U.S.) 
 EBIT MkShr EBIT MkShr EBIT MkShr 
PL×Treated -0.125** -0.005* -0.089** -0.003* -0.161** -0.006** 
 (2.14) (1.88) (2.17) (1.91) (2.08) (2.23) 
Treated = 1 0.056 -0.093*** -0.064 -0.051*** 0.041 -0.076** 
 (1.46) (4.19) (0.76) (4.18) (0.50) (2.41) 
Intercept/Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 13,936 13,936 20,488 20,488 10,472 10,472 
Adj. R2 0.70 0.85 0.68 0.84 0.73 0.88 
This table shows the results of difference-in-difference (DID) regressions of U.S. incumbent firms’ overall financial 
performance metrics on the foreign listing dummy, treated dummy, interaction between foreign listing dummy and 
treated dummy, and other variables. The sample period is 1950-2011. Accounting information is from Compustat 
and the stock market information is from CRSP. The effective foreign listing event is defined as in Table 3. For the 
5% relative ratio there are 181 events during the sample period representing 270 foreign listing placements and 
1,742 U.S. incumbents. Panel A (B) shows the estimation with industry (firm) and year fixed effects. We define 
firms that operate in industries experiencing a foreign listing event in listing year as the “treated” firms. We select a 
“matched” firm for each of 1,742 U.S. rivals from “non-treated” firms based on their key characteristics one year 
before the event. Treated is equal to 1 for the U.S. incumbent firms in industries experiencing foreign listing events 
and 0 otherwise. The variable of interest is PL×Treated, which measures the changes in performance between 
treated and matched firms during the four years around the listing year. EBIT is U.S. rival’s earnings before interest 
and taxes normalized by firm sales. MkShr is the ratio of U.S. rival’s sales over the total industry sales including the 
sales of cross-listed firms. PL is a dummy equal to one for the two years after the foreign listing year and to zero for 
the two years before the foreign listing year. Other independent variables are defined as in Table 3. The standard 
errors are clustered at industry-year level. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. The table also reports the 






Effect of market characteristics on the performance of rival U.S. firms  
 
Panel A: Market proximity characteristics 
 Geographic Prox. Economic Proximity Industrial Proximity  Cultural Proximity 
Dep. Var. = EBIT Low High Low High Low High  Low High 
PL×Treated 0.030 -0.251** -0.059 -0.245** -0.018 -0.316**  0.076 -0.282*** 
 (0.63) (2.39) (0.73) (2.21) (0.36) (2.34)  (1.70) (2.70) 
Treated = 1 -0.040 0.201** -0.002 0.130* -0.017 0.060  -0.0747*** 0.211** 
 (1.14) (2.24) (0.04) (1.74) (0.38) (0.69)  (2.60) (2.42) 
Intercept/Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Obs. 6,296 7,640 6,816 7,120 7,576 6,360  5,960 7,976 
Adj. R2 0.53 0.80 0.69 0.80 0.56 0.78  0.52 0.80 
 
Panel B: Market development and stringency characteristics 
 MkCap/GDP Liquidity Rule of Law  Disclosure 
Dep. Var. = EBIT Low High Low High Low High  Low High 
PL×Treated -0.015 -0.143** 0.076 -0.141** -0.180** -0.126*  -0.089 -0.139* 
 (0.16) (2.05) (0.86) (2.10) (1.98) (1.73)  (1.62) (1.70) 
Treated = 1 -0.011 0.065 0.111 0.072 -0.037 0.048  -0.012 0.079 
 (0.07) (1.44) (1.13) (1.57) (0.39) (1.03)  (0.26) (1.31) 
Intercept/Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Obs. 2,360 11,576 1,576 12,360 2,488 11,448  3,672 10,264 
Adj. R2 0.69 0.78 0.65 0.75 0.74 0.75  0.74 0.75 
This table shows the subsample splits of difference-in-difference (DID) regressions in column (1) of Table 6, Panel 
B based on various cross-market characteristics. The sample period is 1950-2011. There are 181 events during the 
sample period representing 270 foreign listing placements and 1,742 U.S. incumbents. Accounting information is 
from Compustat, and stock market information is from CRSP. The effective foreign listing event is defined as in 
Table 3. Panel A shows the results based on four cross-market proximity characteristics of foreign listed firms. 
Geographic Proximity is the inverse of the great circle distance between the capital cities of home and host countries 
of cross-listings. Economic Proximity is the proportion of exports from a foreign country into the U.S. Industrial 
Proximity is the correlation in the ranked industry distribution of firms listed abroad between foreign country and 
the U.S. Cultural Proximity is a dummy equal to one if a foreign country shares the same language or colonial ties 
with the U.S. All three variables are from Sarkissian and Schill (2004, 2016). Panel B shows the results based on 
four other cross-market characteristics of foreign listed firms. MkCap/GDP is a dummy equals to one if the U.S. 
market capitalization to GDP ratio is higher than that of the foreign country. Market capitalization is from 
Datastream and the Morningstar Dimson, Marsh, & Staunton global returns database. The real GDP values come 
from the historical statistics for the world economy by Angus Maddison. Liquidity is a dummy equals to one if the 
U.S. market liquidity is higher than that of the foreign country. Market liquidity is one minus the equally-weighted 
average ratio of zero daily returns each month across all firms in a given country from Goyenko and Sarkissian 
(2014) averaged for a given calendar year. The Rule of Law is a dummy equals to one if the U.S. investor protection 
is higher than that of the foreign country, and it is based on the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov, et al. (2008). 
Disclosure is a dummy equals to one if the U.S. disclosure standards are higher than that of the foreign country, and 
it is from Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008). All regressions include an unreported intercept, control variables from Table 
4, and firm and year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by industry-year. The absolute t-statistics are in 





Effect of U.S. industry and firm characteristics on the performance of rival U.S. firms  
 
Panel A: Industry characteristics  
 Competitiveness Foreign Sales External Finance 
Dep. Var. = EBIT High Low High Low High Low 
PL×Treated -0.267* -0.051 -0.262** 0.041 -0.351** -0.025 
 (1.72) (1.11) (2.33) (1.20) (2.20) (0.96) 
Treated = 1 -0.061 0.032 0.1495 0.016 0.350 -0.003 
 (0.42) (0.62) (1.40) (0.52) (1.63) (0.09) 
Intercept/Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 5,552 5,424 6,688 6,756 6,052 6,052 
Adj. R2 0.79 0.51 0.77 0.54 0.75 0.58 
 
Panel B: U.S. firm characteristics  
 Market Share Size Age 
Dep. Var. = EBIT High Low Large Small Old Young 
PL×Treated -0.024 -0.264** -0.010 -0.303** -0.029 -0.267** 
 (0.95) (2.14) (0.80) (2.44) (1.03) (2.01) 
Treated = 1 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.177 0.003 0.339 
 (0.56) (0.05) (0.27) (1.55) (0.12) (1.62) 
Intercept/Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 6,968 6,960 6,968 6,968 6,968 6,968 
Adj. R2 0.55 0.76 0.77 0.75 0.68 0.78 
  
Panel B (continued) 
 IPO Issuance Conglomerate Purely U.S. Firm 
Dep. Var. = EBIT IPO Non-IPO Yes No No Yes 
PL×Treated -0.093 -0.128** -0.002 -0.187** -0.041 -0.189* 
 (0.47) (2.15) (0.09) (2.10) (1.63) (1.94) 
Treated = 1 0.000 0.066* -0.038 0.141* 0.031 0.124 
 (0.00) (1.70) (1.30) (1.69) (1.42) (1.38) 
Intercept/Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 720 13,216 4,896 9,040 5,392 8,544 






Table 8 (continued) 
 
This table shows the subsample splits of difference-in-difference (DID) regressions in column (1) of Table 6, Panel 
B based on U.S. industry and firm characteristics. The sample period is 1950-2011. There are 181 events during the 
sample period representing 270 foreign listing placements and 1,742 U.S. incumbents. Accounting information is 
from Compustat, and stock market information is from CRSP. The effective foreign listing event is defined as in 
Table 3. Panel A presents the subsample results of DID regressions based on four industry-level characteristics of 
“treated” firms: Competitiveness, Foreign Sales, and External Finance. We use the fitted Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI) to measure the industry competition of “treated” industries, which is obtained from Hoberg-Phillips 
Database. An industry is defined as competitive if it is below the sample median. Foreign sales is the proportion of 
total foreign sales in “treated” industry one year prior to the listing event, computed as total foreign sales scaled by 
total sales in a given industry. The foreign sales data is obtained from Worldscope. External finance measures the 
dependence on external finance of “treated” industries as in Rajan and Zingales (1998), computed as capital 
expenditures minus cash flows from operations to capital expenditures at the industry level. In Panel A we split the 
sample based on the median values of industry-level variables one year prior to the listing events. Panel B shows the 
subsample results of DID regressions based on U.S. rival firm characteristics. The sample splits are based on sample 
medians of market share, firm size, firm age, IPO issuance, number of business segments (conglomerate or not), and 
sales geography (purely U.S. firm or not) of “treated” firms one year prior to the listing events. IPO dates for 
“treated” firms are obtained from Compustat. IPO sample includes those “treated” firms which experience IPO 
issuance in the listing event year or within two years before the listing event year. The firm segment data is obtained 
from Compustat Segment files. Conglomerate is defined as the U.S. firm with more than one business segment. 
Purely U.S. firm is defined as the U.S. firms only selling to U.S. domestic market and having no foreign sales. All 
other variables are defined as in Table 4. All regressions include unreported intercept, control variables, and firm 
and year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered by industry-year. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. 





Three impact mechanisms on rival U.S. firms: Foreign firm characteristics  
 
Panel A: Financial channel 
 Tobin’s Q U.S. Equity Issuance U.S. Acquisition 
Dep. Var. = EBIT Low High No Yes No Yes 
PL×Treated 0.044 -0.340** -0.110 -0.242** -0.124* -0.184* 
 (1.02) (2.33) (1.56) (2.04) (1.96) (1.66) 
Treated = 1 -0.0375 0.205 0.071 0.140 0.028 0.207 
 (-1.22) (1.42) (1.17) (1.51) (0.68) (1.15) 
Intercept/Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 6,592 5,896 9,384 4,552 9,920 4,016 
Adj. R2 0.49 0.80  0.77 0.69 0.78 0.65 
 
Panel B: Growth channel 
 Asset Growth Sales Growth Capital Expenditure 
Dep. Var. = EBIT Low High Low High Low High 
PL×Treated 0.053 -0.367*** 0.083 -0.317** -0.082 -0.201** 
 (1.23) (2.60) (1.60) (2.45) (0.77) (2.47) 
Treated = 1 -0.053* 0.455** -0.076* 0.238* 0.010 0.142** 
 (1.72) (2.10) (1.81) (1.95) (0.11) (2.28) 
Intercept/Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 6,512 6,344 6,368 6,360 6,368 6,328 
Adj. R2 0.49 0.77  0.53 0.81 0.77 0.68 
 
Panel C: Visibility channel  
 Institutional Holders Analyst Following Trading Volume 
Dep. Var. = EBIT No Yes No Yes Low High 
PL×Treated 0.0126 -0.500** -0.034 -0.312** -0.046 -0.268** 
 (0.31) (2.38) (0.49) (2.40) (0.83) (2.32) 
Treated = 1 -0.025 0.354 0.010 0.215* 0.040 0.042 
 (0.56) (1.49) (0.19) (1.94) (0.82) (0.53) 
Intercept/Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 6,624 3,816 8,808 5,128 6,176 7,560 






Table 9 (continued) 
 
This table shows the subsample splits of difference-in-difference (DID) regressions in column (1) of Table 6, Panel 
B, based on the three impact channels from foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges. The sample period is 1950-2011. 
There are 181 events during the sample period representing 270 foreign listing placements and 1,742 U.S. 
incumbents. Accounting information is from Compustat and the stock market information is from CRSP. The 
effective foreign listing event is defined as in Table 3. We define firms that operate in industries experiencing a 
foreign listing event in listing year as the “treated” firms. A “matched” firm is selected for each of 1,742 U.S. rivals 
from “non-treated” firms based on their key characteristics one year before the event. Treated is equal to one for the 
U.S. incumbent firms in industries experiencing foreign listing events, and is zero otherwise. Panel A shows the 
changes in U.S. rival firms’ EBIT after the listing of foreign firms through the financial channel, which is proxied by 
foreign firms’ Tobin’s Q, equity issuance in the United States, and U.S. target firm acquisition. Tobin’s Q is the 
ratio of the total asset value less book value of equity plus market value of equity over the total asset value. Panel B 
shows the changes in U.S. rival firms’ EBIT after the listing of foreign firms through the growth channel, which is 
proxied by foreign firms’ total asset growth, sales growth, and capital expenditure. Panel C shows the changes in 
U.S. rival firms’ EBIT after the listing of foreign firms through the visibility channel, which is proxied by the 
institutional holdings, analyst coverage, and trading volume. These variables are defined in Table 3. All regressions 
include an unreported intercept, control variables and firm and year fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered 
by industry-year. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. The table also reports the number of observations and 





Competitive effects versus aggregate market and industry timing of foreign listings 
 
Panel A: Aggregate market cycles 
Dep. Var. = Rivals’ CAR  (1) (2) (3) 
Low FL_Intensity -0.072**   
 (2.35)   
Low FL_Intensity_TA  -0.068***  
  (3.15)  
Low Real_GDP   -0.054** 
   (2.26) 
Obs. 1,421 1,421 1,421 
Adj. R2 0.06 0.07 0.05 
 
Panel B: Industry valuation cycles  
Dep. Var. = Rivals’ CAR (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Low Industry_M/B -0.048***     
 (2.60)     
Low Resid_M/B(1)   -0.051***    
  (2.91)    
Low Resid_M/B(2)   -0.046***   
   (3.69)   
Low Resid_M/B(3)      -0.054***  
    (3.62)  
Low CRSP_Ret     -0.063*** 
     (4.67) 
Obs. 1,305 1,305 1,305 1,305 1,305 






Table 10 (continued) 
 
This table shows the results of cross-sectional tests on the short-run portfolio returns of U.S. incumbent rivals to 
foreign listings during aggregate market and industry valuation cycles. The sample period is 1950-2011. There are 
181 events during the sample period representing 270 foreign listing placements and 1,742 U.S. incumbents. 
Accounting information is from Compustat and the stock market information is from CRSP. The effective foreign 
listing event is defined as in Table 3. The dependent variable is the industry-level portfolio returns of U.S. rival 
firm’s CARs over the (-20, +20) day window calculated based on the Fama-French three-factor model. The portfolio 
return is the equally-weighted average of stock returns across all U.S. industry competitors in the same 4-digit SIC 
code for a given foreign listing. Panel A shows the test results on the aggregate market valuation. There are three 
aggregate market cycle proxies. The first is the 3-year moving average of foreign listing intensity (FL_Intensity). 
For each year t, FL_Intensity is defined as (1/3) × ∑j=0,1,2 (# of foreign listings in year t – j divided by the total # of 
foreign listings in year 1950-2011). If FL_Intensity in year t is below the median, the indicator variable equals one 
and zero otherwise. The second is the 3-year moving average of the FL intensity based on foreign listing firms’ total 
assets, FL_Intensity_TA. For each year t, it is defined as (1/3) × ∑j=0,1,2  (total assets of foreign-listed firms  in year t 
– j divided by the total assets of all foreign listings  in year 1950-2011). If FL_Intensity_TA in year t is below the 
median, the indicator variable equals one and zero otherwise. The third is the real GDP growth. Following 
Sarkissian and Schill (2016), the U.S. real GDP growth is computed as log growth rate of annual GDP in 2009 
dollars and then averaged over the previous three years including the current year. The annual U.S. GDP data come 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). Panel B shows the estimates based on the industry timing tests. 
There are four industry valuation cycle proxies. The first is the industry market to book ratio, Industry_M/B, which 
is a simple average of the market to book ratios across all firms in the industry. For each industry, we sort the years 
into two subsamples based on the median value of industry average market to book ratios. Low Industry_M/B 
equals one if the industry average M/B in the event year is below the sample median and is zero otherwise. The 
second is Resid_M/B(1) from Pastor and Veronesi (2003) valuation model. For each year t, we regress the log of the 
market-to-book ratio, log(M/B), on minus the reciprocal of one plus firm age, a dividend dummy, firm leverage, the 
log of total assets, current firm ROE, and the volatility of profitability for each firm. Then we estimate the predicted 
log(M/B) from regressions and take the difference between log(M/B) and predicted log(M/B) for each firm and then 
take the industry average. The third is Resid_M/B(2) follows Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005). For each industry in each 
year, we regress log market value of equity on log book value of equity, log of net income if it is positive (zero 
otherwise), log of the absolute value of net income if net income is negative (zero otherwise), and firm leverage. 
Then we estimate the predicted log(M/B) from regressions and take the difference between log(M/B) and predicted 
log(M/B) and then take the industry average. The fourth is Resid_M/B(3) from Hoberg and Phillips (2010). We 
again estimate the Pastor and Veronesi (2003) valuation model using data from year t − 10 to t – 1 for all firms in 
industry j in year t. Specifically, for each industry j in year t, we again regress log(M/B) on minus the reciprocal of 
one plus firm age, a dividend dummy, firm leverage, the log of total assets, current firm ROE, and the volatility of 
profitability for each firm based on a rolling window of ten years. Then we estimate the predicted log(M/B) from 
regressions and take the difference between log(M/B) and predicted log(M/B) and take the simple average. For each 
industry, we sort the years into two subsamples based on the median value of each of the industry average valuation 
measures. Low Resid_M/B(x) equals one if the industry average Resid_M/B(x) in the event year is below the sample 
median and is zero otherwise, where x = 1, 2, 3. The fifth is value-weighted stock returns across all firms in an 
industry. The stock return data is obtained from CRSP. Low CRSP_Ret equals one if the CRSP value-weighted 
returns in industry k in the year t is below the median and is zero otherwise. The standard errors are clustered by 






Competitive effect versus market entry effect of U.S.-listed foreign firms 
 
Panel A: U.S. rivals’ CARs around the listing events  
 U.S. business presence prior to cross-listing 
 No Yes 
Window (days) # Portfolios CAR (%) P-value # Portfolios CAR (%) P-value 
(-5, +5) 113 -0.279 0.211 156 -0.452* 0.085 
(-10,+10) 113 -0.409 0.176 156 -1.182*** 0.009 
(-20,+20) 113 -0.885* 0.053 156 -2.240*** 0.001 
(-30,+30) 113 -1.455* 0.055 156 -3.231*** 0.000 
 
Panel B: U.S. rivals’ long-run performance  
 U.S. business presence prior to cross-listing 
Dep. Var. = EBIT No Yes 
PL×Treated -0.009 -0.177** 
 (0.15) (2.08) 
Treated = 1 0.031 0.079 
 (0.47) (1.33) 
Intercept/Controls Yes Yes 
Firm/Year FE Yes Yes 
Obs. 3,544 10,392 
Adj. R2 0.61 0.76 
This table shows the short-run and long-run impact of foreign firms with and without direct presence in the United 
States on their U.S. rivals. The sample period is 1950-2011. There are 181 events during the sample period 
representing 270 foreign listing placements and 1,742 U.S. incumbents. Accounting information is from Compustat, 
and stock market information is from CRSP. The effective foreign listing are is defined as in Table 3. We define 
firms that operate in industries experiencing a foreign listing event in listing year as the “treated” firms. A 
“matched” firm is selected for each of 1,742 U.S. rivals from “non-treated” firms based on their key characteristics 
one year before the event. Treated is equal to one if the U.S. incumbent firm is in industries experiencing foreign 
listing events, and is zero otherwise. A foreign firm has a U.S. business presence if it has a sales office, 
headquarters, or subsidiaries in the United States prior to its listing date. Panel A shows the average short-term 
portfolio cumulative abnormal returns, CARs (in percent), of U.S. competing firms around listing dates of foreign 
firms without and with U.S. business presence prior to the listing, as well as the p-values of the average CARs in 
each event window. The event window is in days. The CARs are calculated based on the Fama-French three-factor 
model using portfolio returns for each industry competitor. The portfolio return is the equally-weighted average of 
stock returns across all matched U.S. industry competitors in the same 4-digit SIC code for a given foreign listing. # 
Portfolios is the number of identified CARs. Panel B shows the subsample split of difference-in-difference (DID) 
regressions as in column (1) of Table 6, Panel B based on the U.S. business presence. The control variables are from 
in Table 4. All regressions include an unreported intercept, year and firm fixed effects. The standard errors are 
clustered at industry-year level. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 












Plot B: Long-run cumulative abnormal returns of rival U.S. firms 
 
 
Figure 1  
Cumulative abnormal returns of rival U.S. firms around foreign firm listing and delisting. This figure shows 
short-run (Plot A) and long-run (Plot B) average cumulative abnormal returns, CARs, (in percent) of U.S. competing 
firms around listing (solid line) and delisting (dashed line) dates of foreign firms on and from U.S. exchanges, 
respectively. The cumulative abnormal returns are calculated based on the Fama-French three-factor model. The 
event window in Plot A is 60 days around listing and delisting dates of foreign firms. The event window in Plot B is 
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Months after the listing event







Cumulative abnormal returns of rival U.S. firms before foreign listing dates. This plot shows the average 
portfolio cumulative abnormal returns, CARs, (in percent) of U.S. competing firms around the actual foreign listing 
events (solid line, same as in Figure 1), those six months (6M) before the listing event (long dashed line), and those 
twelve months (12M) before the listing event (shorter dashed line) within the 60-day window. The cumulative 
abnormal returns are calculated based on the three-factor Fama-French model. CAR is defined as the equally-
weighted average of stock returns across all U.S. industry competitors for a given foreign listing. The sample period 
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A.1. Alternative Risk-Adjustment Models  
In this section we repeat our tests presented in Table 2 for two alternative risk-adjustment models 
in estimating CARs of U.S. rival firms: the market model and the four-factor Carhart (1997) 
model. Table A.1 and A.2 show that both the short-run and long-run rivals’ CARs based the two 
alternative models around the foreign listing dates are negative and significant across all 
windows, and the rivals’ CARs around the delisting dates are economically and statistically 
weaker. These findings are consistent with our main results based on Fama-French three-factor 
model.  
 
A.2. Alternative Operating Performance Measures  
Table A.3 shows the DID regressions results of model (4) using two alternative measures of 
operating performance of U.S. rival firms: ROE and ROA. ROE is return on equity, computed as 
net income divided by the total value of equity. ROA is the return on assets, computed as the 
firm’s revenue minus total operating expenses divided by total assets. The format of the table 
follows that of Table 6 Panel A. We again see a consistent picture across all six columns of the 
table. Table A.3 shows that ROE and ROA of U.S. incumbent firms in affected industries decline 
from the pre-event levels relative to their matching firms, which is consistent with the findings of 
our two main performance measures shown in Panel A of Table 6. 
 
A.3. Cross-Sectional Regressions of Rival Firms’ CARs  
We check whether the U.S. rivals’ CARs vary in the cross-sections as a function of the 
individual proxies for the three impact channels, namely, financial, growth, and visibility. The 
dependent variable, U.S. rivals’ CARs are estimated over the (-20, 20) day window using the 
Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, as in Table 2 Panel A. The independent variables 
are proxies for our three impact mechanisms based on foreign listed firms’ characteristics. 
Consistent with our findings in Table 9, Table A.4 shows that cross-listings from foreign firms 
3 
 
that gain high financial benefits, experience high growth and/or achieve high visibility in the 
U.S. exchanges lead to significantly more negative U.S. rivals’ market reaction. 
 
A.4. Model Selection Bias 
We note that the decision to cross-list is endogenous, so that the sample of U.S. firms that 
experience foreign listing events is not random. As a result, foreign firms in industries that 
decide to cross-list and choose the United States as their share placement venue may have unique 
but unobservable features that simultaneously affect their decision to cross-list and a subsequent 
decline in the performance of U.S. rivals.25 For instance, as we mentioned earlier, firms could 
cross-list in anticipation of changes in their investment and growth opportunities that would 
ultimately affect their corresponding U.S. rivals. 
To address this possible sample selection bias, we use the Heckman (1979) two-stage 
model to gauge whether self-selection affects our findings. For the first stage, we need to select 
observable variables that predict U.S. firms in those industries that are more likely to be affected 
by listings of foreign firms on U.S. exchanges. Our first-stage estimation contains 14 
instruments: firm and industry market-to-book ratios, sales growth, percentage of foreign sales, 
leverage, industry external finance (as in Rajan and Zingales, 1998), four cross-market proximity 
measures (economic, industrial, geographic, and cultural) from Sarkissian and Schill (2004), 
cross-market liquidity from Goyenko and Sarkissian (2014), the anti-self-dealing index from 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008), and disclosure measures from Bae, 
Tan, and Welker (2008). The second-stage estimation includes all five control variables from 
Table 4.  
Table A.5 presents the Heckman test results. Columns (1–2) show that the probability of 
U.S. firms being included in our sample of treated firms is related to all of the fourteen 
                                                          
25  This is not a problem if the omitted variables are the average cross-sectional industry differences or 
macroeconomic trends because industry fixed effect and year fixed effect are included in our analysis. However, a 
cross-listing is often associated with time-varying industry trends and changes in firms’ investment and growth 
opportunities (e.g., Sarkissian and Schill, 2016). 
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instruments except for total assets, cross-market liquidity, and country disclosure standards. 
Columns (3–4) show that the treated firms still experience a negative and significant drop in 
performance after two years from the listing events with the inclusion of inverse Mills ratio. 
Importantly, the inverse Mills ratio is insignificant, indicating that the selection bias in the 
foreign firms’ choice of cross-listing in the United States cannot explain our findings on the 





CARs of rival U.S. firms for the market model 
 
Panel A: Short-run CARs 
 Listings  Delistings 
Window (days) Portfolios CAR (%) P-value  # Portfolios CAR (%) P-value 
(-5, +5) 1,568 -0.811*** 0.000  498 0.552 0.104 
(-10,+10) 1,568 -1.088*** 0.000  498 1.085** 0.036 
(-20,+20) 1,568 -2.215*** 0.000  498 1.873** 0.013 
(-30,+30) 1,568 -1.741*** 0.000  498 1.922** 0.026 
 
Panel B: Long-run CARs 
 Listings  Delistings 
Window (months) Portfolios CAR (%) P-value  # Portfolios CAR (%) P-value 
(0, +6) 1,567 -5.653*** 0.000  498 2.188* 0.085 
(0, +12) 1,567 -9.942*** 0.000  498 2.936 0.115 
(0, +18) 1,567 -13.746*** 0.000  498 4.579* 0.082 
(0, +24) 1,567 -18.057*** 0.000  498 3.661 0.186 
This table shows the average portfolio cumulative abnormal returns, CARs, (in percent) of U.S. competing firms 
around listing and delisting dates of foreign firms, as well as the p-values of the average CARs in each event 
window. The sample period is 1950-2011. Panel A shows the short-run CARs and the event window is in days. 
Panel B shows the long-run CARs and the event window is in months. The CARs are calculated based on the market 
model using portfolio returns for each industry competitor. The portfolio return is the equally-weighted average of 
stock returns across all U.S. industry competitors in the same 4-digit SIC code for a given foreign listing. Portfolios 





CARs of rival U.S. firms for the Carhart (1997) model 
 
Panel A: Short-run CARs 
 Listings  Delistings 
Window (days) Portfolios CAR (%) P-value  # Portfolios CAR (%) P-value 
(-5, +5) 1,568 -0.650*** 0.000  498 0.208 0.326 
(-10,+10) 1,568 -0.905*** 0.000  498 0.842* 0.087 
(-20,+20) 1,568 -1.974*** 0.000  498 1.964** 0.011 
(-30,+30) 1,568 -1.732*** 0.000  498 1.924* 0.072 
 
Panel B: Long-run CARs 
 Listings  Delistings 
Window (months) Portfolios CAR (%) P-value  # Portfolios CAR (%) P-value 
(0, +6) 1,567 -3.946*** 0.000  498 -0.248 0.445 
(0, +12) 1,567 -7.414*** 0.000  498 -0.079 0.487 
(0, +18) 1,567 -10.408*** 0.000  498 1.040 0.370 
(0, +24) 1,567 -13.667*** 0.000  498 -0.248 0.475 
This table shows the average portfolio cumulative abnormal returns, CARs, (in percent) of U.S. competing firms 
around listing and delisting dates of foreign firms, as well as the p-values of the average CARs in each event 
window. The sample period is 1950-2011. Panel A shows the short-run CARs and the event window is in days. 
Panel B shows the long-run CARs and the event window is in months. The CARs are calculated based on the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model using portfolio returns for each industry competitor. The portfolio return is the 
equally-weighted average of stock returns across all U.S. industry competitors in the same 4-digit SIC code for a 
given foreign listing. Portfolios is the number of identified CARs. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 





Difference-in-difference analysis of rival U.S. firms’ ROE and ROA 
 
 
5% asset ratio 
(Foreign/U.S.) 
1% asset ratio 
(Foreign/U.S.) 
10% asset ratio 
(Foreign/U.S.) 
 ROE ROA ROE ROA ROE ROA 
PL×Treated -0.018** -0.006* -0.019*** -0.008*** -0.010 -0.009** 
 (-2.21) (-1.67) (-3.01) (-2.73) (-1.06) (-2.10) 
Treated = 1 0.030 0.024 0.024* 0.021** 0.026 0.023* 
 (1.20) (1.64) (1.84) (2.57) (1.04) (1.87) 
Intercept/Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry/Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 13,936 13,936 20,488 20,488 10,472 10,472 
Adj. R2 0.20 0.32 0.20 0.29 0.20 0.31 
This table shows the results of difference-in-difference (DID) regressions of U.S. incumbent firms’ ROA and ROE 
on the foreign listing dummy, treated dummy, interaction between foreign listing dummy and treated dummy, and 
other variables. The sample period is 1950-2011. Accounting information is from Compustat and the stock market 
information is from CRSP. The effective foreign listing event is defined as in Table 3. For the 5% relative ratio there 
are 181 events during the sample period representing 270 foreign listing placements and 1,742 U.S. incumbents. We 
define firms that operate in industries experiencing a foreign listing event in listing year as the “treated” firms. We 
select a “matched” firm for each of 1,742 U.S. rivals from “non-treated” firms based on their key characteristics one 
year before the event. Treated is equal to 1 for the U.S. incumbent firms in industries experiencing foreign listing 
events and 0 otherwise. The variable of interest is difference-in-difference estimate PL×Treated, which measures the 
changes in performance between treated firms and matched firms during the four years around the listing year. ROE 
is return on equity, computed as net income divided by the total value of equity. ROA is the return on assets, 
computed as the firm’s revenue minus total operating expenses divided by total assets. PL is a dummy equal to one 
for the two years after the foreign listing year and to zero for the two years before the foreign listing year. Other 
independent variables are defined as in Table 4. All the regressions include an unreported intercept, year and 
industry fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at industry-year level. The absolute t-statistics are in 
parentheses. The table also reports the number of observations and the pseudo R-squared. ***, **, and * indicate 




Table A.4  
Cross-sectional regressions of rival U.S. firms’ CARs on channel proxies 
 
Panel A: Finance channel 
Dep. Var. = Rivals’ CAR (1) (2) (3) 
High Tobin Q  -0.015***   
 (2.60)   
U.S. Equity Issuance = “Yes”  -0.018**  
  (2.08)  
U.S. Acquisition = “Yes”   -0.046** 
   (2.47) 
Obs. 1,009 1,009 1,009 
 
Panel B: Growth channel 
Dep. Var. = Rivals’ CAR (1) (2) (3) 
High Total Asset Growth -0.028***   
 (3.73)   
High Total Sales  -0.028***  
  (3.91)  
High Capital Expenditure   -0.021*** 
   (3.53) 
Obs. 1,009 1,009 1,009 
 
Panel C: Visibility channel 
Dep. Var. = Rivals’ CAR (1) (2) (3) 
High Number of Block Holders -0.012*   
 (1.73)   
High Analyst Following  -0.014**  
  (2.07)  
High Trading Volumes   -0.013** 
   (2.15) 
Obs. 1,009 1,009 1,009 
This table shows the results of cross-sectional regressions where U.S. rivals’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) 
are regressed on measures related to three impact mechanisms based on foreign firm characteristics. The dependent 
variable, CARs are estimated over the (-20, +20) day window using the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model 
as in Table 2 Panel A. The independent variables are proxies for each impact channel for each foreign listing in our 
sample. The sample period is 1950-2011. Panel A shows the relation between U.S. rivals’ CARs around the listing 
dates and three proxies for the financial benefits that may achieve via foreign listings, namely foreign firms’ Tobin’s 
Q, U.S. equity issuance, and U.S. target firm acquisition. Panel B shows the relation between U.S. rivals’ CARs 
around the listing dates and three proxies for the growth rate of foreign listed firms, namely, the foreign firms’ total 
asset growth, sales growth, and capital expenditure. Panel C shows the relation between U.S. rivals’ CARs around 
the listing dates and three proxies for the visibility channel, namely, the institutional holdings, analyst coverage, and 
trading volume. These variables are defined in Table 3. The coefficients are shown for the “High” values, which are 
the corresponding values above the sample median for each foreign firm characteristic. The standard errors are 
clustered by industry. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. The table also reports the number of observations. 





Heckman selection model 
 
First Stage: Probit Model (Treated = 1) Second Stage: OLS Two-Year Changes in EBIT 
Log(Assets) 0.003 Treated = 1 -0.239* 
 (0.28)  (1.88) 
Leverage -0.376*** Inverse Mills Ratio -0.153 
 (3.49)  (0.76) 
M/B 0.079*** Log(Assets) -0.001 
 (3.00)  (0.05) 
Sales Growth 0.125** Log(Age) -0.072** 
 (2.29)  (2.30) 
Foreign Sales (%) 1.317*** Leverage -0.136 
 (11.17)  (0.78) 
Industry External Finance 0.024*** M/B 0.042 
 (2.95)  (0.45) 
Industry M/B 0.097*** Cash 0.260 
 (7.25)  (1.34) 
Geographic Proximity -0.012**   
 (2.34)   
Economic Proximity 0.004***   
 (5.46)   
Industrial Proximity 0.274***   
 (4.04)   
Cultural Proximity -0.447***   
 (7.56)   
Liquidity -0.002   
 (0.07)   
Law -0.514***   
 (6.81)   
Disclosure 0.030   
 (0.76)   
Intercept Yes Intercept Yes 
Industry FE Yes Industry FE Yes 
Obs. 99,589 Obs. 99,329 
Pseudo-R2 0.176 Adj. R2 0.010 
This table presents the results of Heckman selection model. The first column shows the first-stage estimation of 
probit model using a sample of 1,742 “treated” firms and all the other U.S. firms that do not experience a foreign 
listing event in the listing event year. The second column shows the second-stage OLS estimation by including 
inverse Mills ratio. The instruments for the first stage model are: firm and industry market-to-book ratios, sales 
growth, percentage of foreign sales, leverage, industry external finance, four cross-market proximity measures 
(geographic, economic, industrial, and cultural) from Sarkissian and Schill (2004), cross-market liquidity from 
Goyenko and Sarkissian (2014), the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 
(2008), and disclosure measure from Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008). The two-year change in EBIT for a U.S. rival 
firm in the second-stage estimation is computed as the average value of EBIT two years after the listing year minus 
the average value of EBIT two years before the listing year. The controls in the second-stage estimation are from 
Table 4. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
